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MILITARY AND POLITICAL REARMAMENT

Maurice Duverger

IT IS NOT ENOUGH to want peace. We must want the conditions of peace. These may be obscure in detail, but their general outline remains clear: peace can be safeguarded only by the coexistence of two blocs, the oriental and the occidental, the communist and the democratic. The dreams of world unification, of the resurrection of the Roman Empire on a global scale, cannot be realized in the present historical era. For the East will not yield to the West any more than the West will to the East; the coexistence of the two blocs can be terminated only by war. But contemporary military techniques and political structures crush all hope for a short and limited war. A war between the two blocs would spread over the entire world; it would be very long and very destructive. Europe would be ruined first, but America would soon follow. Instead of unifying the world, we would destroy it; instead of reviving the Roman Empire, we would create material and moral conditions analogous to those which, in the centuries following the fall of Rome, brought about that long eclipse of civilization in the Occident.

Ideally, of course, each of the two blocs would accept without reservation—by means of certain frontier adjustments—the actual *status quo;* and each would give up any thought of expansion to the detriment of the other. General disarmament would be the consequence of this attitude, and the token of its sincerity. It would be a question not only of military disarmament but of political disarmament as well, and would imply the suppression of all fifth columns and foreign propaganda. Such measures would certainly entail immense advantages for mankind: if the millions of working hours wasted in the manufacture of arms could be employed in the production of con-

sumers' goods, the standard of living would be raised considerably. Unfortunately, such measures have no chance of being applied: to make people believe the contrary would be to deceive them, and to lull them to sleep with an illusion that would inevitably be followed by a terrible awakening. Military disarmament is inconceivable without an international control that permits ascertainment of its effectiveness. But the Soviet state, by its very structure, is prevented from submitting to such supervision. This is a very regrettable fact but it is incontestable. The worst derangement of the mind, according to Bossuet, consists in seeing things not as they are but as we want them to be. General military disarmament is desirable but impossible, and political disarmament seems hardly more realizable. Communism dreams of spreading itself over the entire world. But all ideologies share this proselytism: democracies dream of democratizing the entire world, Catholics of converting the entire world to Catholicism, Protestants of extending Protestantism without limitation. Whoever thinks he possesses the truth seeks naturally to impart it to others. It is as natural for the Soviets to want to spread the teaching of Marx and Lenin as it is for liberals to want to spread the principles contained in the Declaration of Independence and in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, or for Christians to want to make the Gospel known to all the peoples of the world. There is no hope that the Soviets will renounce the international activity of the communist parties. They will not and cannot do so, for their doctrine is ecumenical by nature.

Therefore, the continued existence of a Red Army and the continued activity of the communist parties constitute two elements which are fundamental to the problem of peace. No solution can succeed that does not take them into account. Under these conditions, the coexistence of the two worlds presupposes a certain balance between their respective forces: the problem of peace becomes the problem of the maintenance of an equilibrium between East and West. Every disruption of this equilibrium would create an incentive to war for the stronger bloc, and would at the same time create within the weaker one a complex of inferiority, frustration, and encirclement which—according to the classical Freudian pattern—would naturally tend to change to aggressiveness.

On the military level the world equilibrium therefore presupposes a Western rearmament of a *permanent* character. This last characteristic cannot be emphasized too strongly. As long as general conscription has not been abolished in the U.S.S.R.—and for a long time to come there is little chance that it will be—similar conscription will

have to be maintained or established in the West. Certain circles in America remain hostile to such a policy. To permanent military service analogous to that functioning in Europe they would prefer, whether consciously or not, some violent and quick action. Unfortunately the facts do not permit any choice: to reject general and regular conscription would mean either to accept a one-sided military weakness that would, at the first opportunity for aggression, lead to war, or to fall back on the foolish doctrine of a preventive war. To maintain peace we have to pay the price of peace.

But, contrary to current opinion, military rearmament is not enough. A Western army can do no more than deprive the U.S.S.R. of the temptation to resort to war as a means of spreading communism throughout the world; it could not halt the propaganda of the communist parties and of a "peaceful conquest" by disintegration from within. The sovietization of the Balkans is essentially the result of this latter process. The victory of Mao Tse-tung probably owes more to the political organization of the Chinese communist party than to its strictly military action. If in June 1950 North Korea had not made the mistake of invading South Korea, the Syngman Rhee régime would eventually have collapsed—to the advantage of the régime of Kim Il Sung. Between 1945 and 1949 the monopoly of the atomic bomb conferred military superiority upon the West, and the present rearmament program is helping it to regain a position of equality. But the West remains in a position of political inferiority. The U.S.S.R. retains monopoly of the technique of encompassing and organizing the masses in a way that permits it to extend its influence peacefully without any effective reaction on the part of the West.

The West views the communist parties with a mixture of fear and contempt. We are contented with identifying them, in those countries where they hold the real power, with a totalitarian régime and a police system, and with classifying them elsewhere as fifth columns comprised of traitors whose purpose is to prepare for a Russian invasion. The U.S.S.R. has tried in every way possible to penetrate the secret of atomic power; but our democrats are satisfied with very superficial judgments of the political technique that permits the Russians to spread communism without recourse to war. We do not deny the terroristic and police aspects of this technique and of the fifth column; but we must admit that they describe only one part of the truth, and not even the most important part. By their innermost nature the communist parties constitute systems of the methodical and scientific organization of the masses, systems which make it pos-

sible for them to mold the masses politically and to recruit governing elites from among them.

Within each natural community—village, town, district, city block, factory, plant—the party cell forms an active nucleus, designed equally for the destruction of the existing régime and for the construction of a new régime. It is highly indicative that the party structure is almost identical in countries where the party is in power, in those where it is in opposition, in the advanced and modern nations of Western Europe, and among the backward peoples of East Asia. The small size of these elementary groups confers upon them, first of all, a great inner cohesion: the smaller the community the more intense seem to be its social ties. At the same time their small size makes these groups more flexible: they are capable of indefinite variation, assuming the forms of the societies in which they exist. By reason of close adherence to these forms, they lack an artificial, foreign, or strange character. On the contrary, they seem to grow organically out of these social forms. Instead of taking their place, they enliven, direct, and activate them, while at the same time they transform them.

This organism of thousands of cells is controlled by a precise mechanism of vertical interconnections. The cells do not communicate directly among themselves but through the intermediary of their delegates at a higher level. The same technique of delegation and of absence of direct contact is repeated on every one of the numerous echelons of the hierarchy. This system makes absolutely impossible the development of schisms, factions, and an organized opposition. Should dissidence arise in one cell, it cannot directly contaminate the neighboring cells; it can spread only through the intermediary of a delegate on a superior level. But here the atmosphere is already more filtered and more secure. The same obstacle is encountered on every level, and becomes more powerful as one ascends because the ranks are better formed and more carefully tested. These successive dams are all the stronger because the "center" plays an important part in the designation of the different bearers of responsibility, retaining continuous contact with those who inform it of every suspicious movement. Thus, as soon as a crack appears in any part of the apparatus, the center can intervene with great energy and effectiveness. The system is much like the safety mechanism that exists on ships, where an area is subdivided into watertight compartments that are hermetically sealed off from each other; the party itself has used this comparison. Thus the smallness, variety, and dissemination of the cells entail neither disconnection nor centrifugal movement.

The concentration of effort, effected by means of vertical links, is completed by the mechanism of "democratic centralism." The com-

munists apply this term to a group of complex institutions designed for the following purposes: first, to inform the center with the greatest possible exactness of the viewpoint existing at the "base," in order to permit the center to make a valid decision; second, to enforce these decisions of the center on all levels in a manner which is rigorous and precise but also comprehensive—that is to say, with the adherence of the echelons at the base. Thus the system is centralized, since the decisions are made at the top, but it remains democratic—we are told—since the decision is based on the opinions of the lower strata and since their approval is sought continuously as that decision is carried out. To arrive at this result the local leaders, although theoretically elected by the base, are responsible to the superior echelons rather than to the voters. It is their task, therefore, to translate as correctly as possible for the superior echelons the reactions and opinions of the base, and to explain with patience and precision to the base the reasons for the decisions made at the center. The local leaders have a complex and very important role as informers and educators. Democratic centralism requires, on the one hand, that very free discussions take place at the base *before* the decision is made, in order to enlighten the center, but that the most rigorous discipline be observed by all *after* the decision has been made. From then on every effort must be made to effect its execution. To this end, very exact control is provided for and assured by the center: the party leaders on all levels must make certain that the decisions are carried out by all the units under their command. Democratic centralism also requires that the executives explain to the base the reasons for the decision, and this is done in such a way that the essential contact with the base is never lost.

One may have a very bad opinion of communist parties, but it must be admitted that the mechanism they have constructed is remarkably effective. First of all it makes possible a real circulation of political blood: the decisions of the center penetrate to the last echelons at the base, since commentary and explanation are never separated from the execution of policy. Furthermore, the center is at all times kept informed of the opinion at the base in all its complexity and diversity. Thus, by a series of continuous actions and reactions which are closely interdependent, the center always knows in every detail the situation at the base, and influences it while at the same time adapting its tactics to it. It is impossible to say truthfully either that the center follows the base or that the base follows the center: the party leadership listens to the masses and speaks to them at the same time, its message being constantly attuned to what it hears. Thus, the party leadership proceeds by means of light touches and infinitely subtle pressures; but its influence is all the more profound and durable the less it hurts those

who are subjected to it, and the better it is attuned to their thoughts. Without knowing it, the masses begin to be guided, directed, and transformed. Gradually their attitude arises less and less from their own midst, from their own spontaneous initiative, and more and more from that of their chiefs. The masses are under the illusion that they determine their own destinies while actually they obey more and more; but they are less and less aware of it.

The system also permits the gradual formation of cadres and the constitution of elites for a diversity of political functions. The party members form the first elite in the midst of the masses which they influence. Among the party members, the cell leaders constitute a second elite, the role of which is particularly important: the entire system rests, in the last analysis, on these "political corporals." From here the hierarchy rises by degrees to the higher echelons. This formation of cadres is based on a fairly well developed theoretical indoctrination, but most of all on practical experience: the smallness of cells permits the testing of militants rising from the ranks by entrusting them with responsibilities according to their capabilities. Democratic centralism makes it possible to guide and control them continuously. The mechanism of vertical interconnections limits the possible damage their inexperience might cause. It is thus possible to bring forth quite rapidly from uneducated and backward masses men capable of organizing and leading them—with an effectiveness which is all the greater because they remain an integral part of the masses, sharing their daily life, their worries, and their hopes.

Nevertheless, the very nature of the party limits its effectiveness. The developed and diversified societies of Western Europe and North America are strongly opposed to regimentation of this kind; moreover, they do not need it. Their individualism, their love of personal liberty cannot be adapted to the rigid discipline and the rigorous hierarchy of the party, nor to the collective character of its activity. The material and intellectual development of Western societies makes unnecessary the selection of elites at the base, on the level of political corporals. In the West it is only the working classes of France and Italy that are susceptible to the attraction of communism. Everywhere else the progress of the party is negligible. Its success in France and Italy is explained by local factors: a lower living standard, the narrow conservatism of employers, the ineptness of the socialist parties, the need for a faith and a system of beliefs which followed the decline of strong religious influence, and so on. Even that local success results largely from a misconception; the majority of party followers are not genuine communists. In France, as in Italy, moreover, the

development of communism seems to have come to a stop. The party has probably attained its maximum saturation point. Only a very grave economic or political crisis could increase its influence, and even then only to a limited extent.

It is quite the contrary with the great masses that people Asia. They are extremely responsive to the activities of the party since its technique of political organization is particularly adapted to the structure of these masses, to their poor living standard, to their lack of education, and also to their profound desire for national independence and autonomous leadership. Thus, the problem of the political rearmament of the West coincides in its main lines with the problem of its resistance to the expansion of communism in Asia.

The dilemma "Europe or Asia?" is a false one. The real dilemma is: what methods should be employed in Europe and Asia, respectively, in order to maintain the equilibrium between the two blocs? It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the military rearmament of the West must above all be directed toward Europe, and that its political rearmament must be directed toward Asia. In other words, Europe needs primarily a military harness, while Asia needs primarily a political harness. I hope my readers will not see in this thesis the egoistic and partial viewpoint of a European, but rather the considered opinion of a Westerner who has given much thought to the future of the Occidental community in its entirety. The examples of 1914 and 1939 show that final victory belongs to those who possess the greater industrial power. The present American-European bloc is much more powerful in this regard than the Russian bloc, even with the support of China (whose industry is very weak). Conversely, a Russo-European bloc would be much stronger than America. In military terms, the problem of the defense of the West melts into that of the protection of Europe against invasion. United by Germany, Europe alone was able to resist for four years the coalition of the British Empire, the United States, and the Soviet Union. United with the U.S.S.R. and organized by the iron discipline of the Soviet régime, the immense European factory would tip the balance of power in favor of communism. Hence the security of America requires that the industries of Europe not fall prey to the power of the Soviets. The security of peace requires that this essential pawn—on which victory and world leadership depend—not become a prey, tempting because of its weakness, to this powerful neighbor. This weakness is essentially a military one. As has been said, communism has no chance in the immediate future of making progress in Western Europe. But the distance

between the Russian armies and the Atlantic is the same as that between Chicago and Washington.

The problem of Asia, on the other hand, is less military than political. Suppose that the United Nations are victorious in Korea. Peking recognizes the *fait accompli,* general elections are held, a democratic government is installed in Seoul. After a while communist propaganda will again begin to flourish. The instability of parties without tradition or real support, the lack of a governing class, corruption and disorder—all this will open up to such propaganda an ideal field of action. If the troops of the United Nations leave the peninsula, Korean "democracy" will crumble sooner or later. If they stay, hatred of foreigners and nationalist passions will offer to the Soviets even greater possibilities for propaganda. The only way to resist it would be a permanent occupation, which would paralyze a part of Western military power. Suppose MacArthur's policy is applied to China and that it succeeds beyond all expectation: the U.S.S.R. does not intervene; Mao Tse-tung is beaten, and the communist régime is replaced by democratic institutions. The drama would develop according to the same pattern, only on a much larger scale. That is, the occupation troops would have to be much more numerous if one did not want to return to the *status quo ante,* and the ensuing weakening of the West would be much greater.

It might be said that it would be sufficient gradually to replace American and Western troops by indigenous forces. But who would guarantee their loyalty and firmness? Have we not seen already in China and Korea what becomes of national armies under the orders of weak and corrupt régimes? It is not sufficient to create an army, or to erect state machinery with a government, ministers, officials, and police. Such a superstructure will float in the air as long as it is not supported by a substructure: it is the people we have to win, as communism wins them. The only way to fight the communist system of mass enlistment is with another system of mass enlistment—as well if not better adapted to the needs of the masses.

What do the democracies offer to the peoples of East Asia? The continuation of ancient feudalism under the appearance of a parliamentary régime on the European pattern. But the second is insufficient to rejuvenate the first: on the contrary, it tends to weaken the prestige of feudalism in the eyes of the elite, thus strengthening the effect of a natural development. A parliamentary régime on the Western pattern is not at all suitable for the economic and social structure of Asia, nor for its mentality. Our Western political system rests on the middle class, on the liberal and Christian tradition, and on a

population which in its entirety enjoys a rather advanced level of material and intellectual progress. Nothing of the sort exists in Asia. There the parties are nothing but clans of individuals, a thin film on the surface of immense masses of uneducated and illiterate peasants always on the verge of famine and destitution. The strength of communism lies in its ability to adapt itself to these masses, to offer them propaganda slogans that are directly related to them (nationalism, social change), and above all to equip them with an organization admirably adapted to their mentality and their needs, from which can be drawn elites that can organize and lead them.

For the Western nations, communism and the one-party system represent a step backward. The increase in material well-being which they promise is too uncertain and too slight to compensate for the loss of civic and social liberties which they involve. The net result, moreover, might be a leveling off at the living standard of Russia or the Balkans, with a resulting general impoverishment. The peoples of the Orient, on the other hand, have no liberties to lose because they have never known any. They do not stand the risk of a lowering of their living standard, which is already on the lowest possible level. Communism does not deprive them of anything; but it brings them a great deal. For the peoples of Asia, its civilizing influence is incontestable. Communism would lower the status of peoples already as far advanced as the Occidentals, but it raises that of backward peoples like those of Asia. Its superiority over the classic techniques of colonialism is beyond doubt. Such techniques operate by means of paternalistic methods: they impose progress and well-being from without; they civilize by systems and methods imported from Europe; and thus they run up against the nationalist sentiment which is now so powerful in the East that it deprives these European methods of any real opportunity. Communism, on the other hand, knows how to give to the peoples of Asia the impression that they are taking their destiny into their own hands; that they themselves will become the artisans of their progress and their modernization; that they will be guided by their own system, chiefs, and methods.

For the Western Allies, the extension of communism in China means an increase of Soviet influence. For the peoples of Asia it signifies national emancipation and political and social modernization. This difference of interpretation paralyzes all efforts of Europe and America, and in fact turns those efforts to the advantage of the Soviet state. The more white troops fight against native communists, the more do the communists become identified with national resistance to a foreign conqueror, and the deeper will be their influence upon

the masses. Under these conditions, all military victories of the Westerners are necessarily without consequence, and in fact create the very conditions for their own downfall. The problem of Asia is that of confronting communist nationalism with another nationalism, more authentic but still as progressive—for Asia is also beginning to become conscious of social questions: it is undergoing simultaneously the revolutions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, of 1848 and 1917. The problem of Asia is that of designing political and social methods as effective for the peoples of East Asia as is the communist system of mass enlistment which I have just described.

Westerners must understand that the evil of communism lies much more in its materialist and totalitarian doctrine than in its system of attracting and organizing the masses—which is no more than a technique and an instrument. This technique could perhaps be diverted from the bad purposes for which it is employed by Moscow to the service of progress among the peoples that are as yet less fully developed. Westerners must free themselves from a tenacious prejudice: European parliamentarism and the American Constitution undoubtedly define a very advanced and very agreeable form of political life—but they are not articles for export to Asia. Parliamentarism could not have functioned in the Europe of the twelfth century; and this is the level of civilization among certain peoples to whom parliamentarism is today presented—even though others, like Japan, have entirely different intellectual and moral traditions. It is clear that classic democracy applied to countries with an archaic social structure and an uneducated population will only maintain and consolidate the power of traditional aristocracies; that is to say, it will impede the establishment of real democracy. It is necessary here to reflect on the example of Turkey, the true significance of which has not yet been appreciated. Turkey is today the most democratic of all the states of the Near East, the only one that has real political parties rather than feudal cliques—ghost organizations stirred up by a few intellectuals or by fanatical religious sects. Turkey is also the only country where Western parliamentarism was not applied immediately but only after a "probationary period" of twenty-five years under a one-party régime —which, however, was not a totalitarian one. I am not saying that this policy is capable of general application; I am merely citing a fact.

Westerners will have to admit to themselves that their own institutions function poorly and that they themselves are, to put it mildly, not well governed. For them, political rearmament is not merely a question of external defense—but this, as Kipling said, is another story.

THE AGE OF THE WORLD VIEW

Martin Heidegger

METAPHYSICS reflects on the nature of the existent and on the nature of truth. Metaphysics lays the foundation of an age by giving it the basis of its essential form through a particular analysis of the existent and a particular conception of truth. This basis dominates all the phenomena which distinguish the age. Conversely, it must be possible to recognize the metaphysical basis in these phenomena through sufficient reflection on them. Reflection is the courage to question as deeply as possible the truth of our own presuppositions and the exact place of our own aims.

Among the essential phenomena of modern times we must count science. A phenomenon with the same degree of importance is mechanical technique. This should not be misinterpreted, however, as a mere application of modern mathematical natural science to practice. Mechanical technique is itself an independent transformation of practice such that it of itself demands the application of mathematical natural science. Mechanical technique remains the most visible product to date of the essence of modern technology, which is identical with the essence of modern metaphysics.

A third equally important phenomenon of modern times consists in the process by which art comes within the horizon of aesthetics: the work of art becomes the object of an experience; as a result, art is viewed as the expression of the life of man.

A fourth modern phenomenon is exhibited in the fact that human activity is understood and accomplished as culture. Culture thus becomes the realization of the highest values through the cultivation of the highest goods of man. It is part of the essence of culture, as such cultivation, to cultivate itself and so to become "culture politics."

A fifth phenomenon of modern times is the transition to godlessness. This expression does not mean the mere displacement of the gods—coarse atheism. The transition to godlessness is a twofold process: on the one hand the world view becomes Christianized in so far as the cause of the world is conceived as the infinite, the unconditioned, the absolute; on the other hand Christendom trans-

forms its Christianity into a world view (the Christian world view) and so adapts itself to modern times. The transition to godlessness is the state of indecision about God and the gods. Christianity has contributed most to its development. But the transition to godlessness is far from excluding religiosity; on the contrary, it is through religiosity that the relation to the gods becomes, for the first time, a religious experience. When it has come to that, the gods have fled. The resulting void is filled by the historical and psychological investigation of the myth.

On what conception of the existent and on what interpretation of truth do these phenomena rest?

We limit our question to the first phenomenon, to science.

Wherein lies the essence of modern science?

On what conception of the existent and of truth does this essence rest? If we succeed in reaching, finally, the metaphysical foundation on which modern science is grounded, then it must be possible to perceive the very essence of modern times.

When we use the word science today, it means something which differs essentially from the *doctrina* and *scientia* of the Middle Ages, but also from the Greek *episteme*. Greek science was never exact—precisely for the reason that it could not by its nature be exact and did not need to be exact. There is therefore no sense whatever in supposing that modern science is more exact than that of antiquity. Nor can we say that Galileo's doctrine of freely falling bodies is true, and that Aristotle, who teaches that light bodies strive upward, is wrong; for the Greek conception of the nature of body and place and their relation to one another rests on a different explanation of the existent, and therefore requires a correspondingly different kind of viewing and questioning of natural processes. No one would think of maintaining that Shakespeare's poetry is more advanced than that of Aeschylus. But it is even more impossible to say that the modern apprehension of the existent is more correct than the Greek. Thus if we want to understand the essence of modern science, we must first of all free ourselves of the habit of contrasting the newer science with the older simply by applying the standard of gradual progress.

The essence of what we now call science is research. What is the essence of research?

It is the fact that knowledge establishes itself as a procedure in a realm of the existent, of nature or of history. Procedure means here not only method, a way of proceeding—for every procedure needs a sphere in which it can move—but, more precisely, the opening of

such a sphere; this is the basic procedure of research. It is accomplished through the projection of a definite ground plan of natural processes in a sphere of the existent, for example, in nature. The projection indicates the way in which the cognitive procedure must adhere to the sphere it has opened up for itself. This adherence is the discipline of research. Through the projection of the ground plan and the condition of exactitude the method secures for itself its proper area within the sphere of being. A glance at the earliest, and normative, modern science, mathematical physics, reveals what is meant. In so far as modern atomic physics is still physics, the essential aspect—the only one we are concerned with here—is applicable.

Modern physics is called mathematical because it distinctively applies a very definite mathematics. But it can proceed mathematically in this way only because it is in a deeper sense already mathematical. *Ta mathemata* means for the Greeks that which man knows prior to his observation of the existent and his acquaintance with things: of bodies—the corporeal; of plants—the vegetative; of animals—the animate; of man—the human. Numbers, too, belong to this category of the already known, that is, the "mathematical." If we find three apples on the table, we recognize that there are three of them. But the number three, threeness, we know already. This means that number is something "mathematical." Only because numbers represent, as it were, the most obvious of things always known beforehand, and hence the best known in the class of the mathematicals, was "mathematical" forthwith reserved as the name of things of the nature of number. But the essence of the mathematical is by no means determined by the numerable. Physics is in general the knowledge of nature, then in particular the knowledge of the substantially corporeal in its motion; for this appears immediately and universally, even if in different ways, in all natural phenomena. If, then, physics explicitly takes on a mathematical form, this means that something is emphatically defined in advance as the already known. This definition means nothing less than the demarcation of what nature is to mean for the knowledge of nature that is sought, that is, the self-sufficient kinetic relation of points of mass connected in space and time. On this blueprint of nature that is assumed to be already known, the following conditions—among others—are entered. Motion means change of place. No motion or direction of motion is preferred to another. Every place is like every other. No point of time is superior to any other. Every force is determined only by—*is* only—its consequences in motion, that is to say, by the magnitude of change of place in the unit of time. Every event must be read into this

blueprint of nature. It is only within the framework of this blueprint that a natural event becomes visible as such. This design of nature therefore contains its verification in the fact that for every step of its investigation physical research depends on it in advance. The character of dependence, the discipline of research, is in each case derived from the "ground plan." The discipline of mathematical natural science is exactitude. All events, if they are to be perceived as natural events at all, must here be determined in advance as spatiotemporal kinetic magnitudes. Such determination is carried out through measurement with the help of number and calculation. But mathematical science is not exact because it makes exact calculations; rather it must make such calculations because its way of adhering to its sphere has the character of exactitude. On the other hand, all humanistic disciplines, in fact, all sciences of living things, must, precisely in order to remain disciplines, necessarily be inexact. To be sure, the living can also be apprehended as a spatiotemporal kinetic magnitude—but then it is no longer understood as living. The inexactitude of the historical disciplines is not a shortcoming, but only the fulfillment of a demand essential to their kind of research. Of course, the delineation and the fixation of the object area of the historical disciplines remains not only different from but, as a task, much more difficult than the realization of the discipline of exact science.

Science becomes research through the projection and through the verification of the projection in the discipline of the procedure. But projection and discipline develop into what they are only in the procedure. This is the mark of the second essential characteristic of research. If the projected area is to become objective, then we must make it accessible in all the complexity of its layers and interlacings. Therefore the procedure must have its vision free for the mutability of the given. Only within the orbit of the ever-otherwise of change is the plenitude of the particular, of the facts, revealed. But the facts must become objective. The procedure must therefore represent the changeable in its change, bring it to a standstill, and nevertheless let the motion be as motion. The permanent in the facts and the permanence of their change as such are the rule. The permanence of change in the necessity of its course is the law. Only within the boundaries of rule and law are facts revealed as the facts they are. The investigation of facts in the sphere of nature is in itself the establishment and preservation of rule and law. The procedure through which an object area is apprehended has the character of clarification. It always remains twofold. It founds an unknown

by means of a known, and at the same time preserves this known through that unknown. Clarification is carried out in investigation. This occurs in natural science—according to the type of field investigated and the aim of the clarification—by means of experiment. However, natural science does not become research through experiment; on the contrary, experiment becomes possible where, and only where, natural knowledge has already been transformed into research. It is because, and only because, modern physics is essentially mathematical that it can be experimental. But because neither the medieval *doctrina* nor the Greek *episteme* is science in the sense of research, they leave no room for experiment. It was indeed Aristotle who first understood what *empeiria (experientia)* means: the observation of the things themselves, of their properties and alterations under changing conditions and therewith the knowledge of the way in which things as a rule behave. But an observation which is aimed at this kind of knowledge, the *experimentum,* remains essentially different from the research experiment which belongs to science as research—essentially different even when the ancient and medieval observations work with number and measurement, and when the observation makes use of particular contrivances and instruments. For in this the decisive feature of the experiment is entirely lacking. This begins when a law is taken as a point of departure. To set up an experiment means to assume a situation where it becomes possible to trace a definite nexus of motions in the necessity of its course, that is, to control its calculation in advance. But the determination of the law occurs with a view to the ground plan of the object area. The latter gives the measure and fixes in advance the representation of the situation. Such representation, in which and with which the experiment starts, is no capricious imagining. That is why Newton said: *hypotheses non fingo,* the bases are not arbitrarily invented. They are developed out of the ground plan of nature and are written into it. The experiment is that procedure which in its arrangement and execution is borne and guided by the law basic to it, in order to produce the facts which confirm the law or deny confirmation. The more exactly the ground plan of nature has been projected, the more exact will be the possibility of the experiment. The much cited medieval schoolman Roger Bacon can therefore never be the forerunner of the modern experimental research scientist, but he remains simply the successor of Aristotle. For in the interval Christianity has assigned the genuine possession of truth to faith, to the acceptance of Holy Writ and church doctrine. The highest knowledge and doctrine is theology as the exegesis of the divine word

of revelation which is set down in the Scriptures and is proclaimed through the Church. Knowledge is here not research, but the correct understanding of the authoritative word and the authorities proclaiming it. Therefore, in the acquisition of knowledge in the Middle Ages the exposition of the sayings and doctrines of the various authorities takes precedence. The *componere scripta et sermones,* the *argumentum ex verbo* is decisive and is at the same time the reason why the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy transmitted to the Middle Ages had to become scholastic dialectic. If Roger Bacon here demands the *experimentum*—and he does demand it—he does not mean the experiment of science as research; but he requires, instead of the *argumentum ex verbo,* the *argumentum ex re,* and instead of the exposition of doctrines, the observation of the things themselves, that is, Aristotelian *empeiria.*

The modern research experiment, however, is not only an observation more exact in degree and scope, but the radically different procedure of the confirmation of a law in the framework and in the service of an exact projection of nature. In the historical disciplines the critique of sources corresponds to the experiment in scientific research. Let this name designate here the whole process of finding, sifting, confirming, evaluating, preserving, and interpreting sources. Historical explanation grounded on the critique of sources does not, indeed, reduce the facts to laws and rules. But neither is it limited to the mere reporting of facts. In the historical disciplines just as in the natural sciences the procedure aims at representing the permanent and making history an object. But history can become objective only if it is past. The permanent in history, that with reference to which historical explanation assesses the unique and the diverse in history, is that-which-has-always-already-happened-once, the comparable. In the constant comparison of everything with everything the intelligible is figured out and is indicated as the ground plan of history. The sphere of historical research extends only as far as historical explanation reaches; the unique, the infrequent, the simple—in short, the great—in history is never self-evident and therefore remains inexplicable. Historical research does not deny greatness in history but explains it as the exception. In this explanation greatness is measured against the common and the average. Nor is there any other historical explanation so long as explanation means reduction to the intelligible, and so long as history remains research, that is, explanation. It is because history as research projects and objectifies the past in the sense of a nexus of events which can be explained and surveyed

that it requires the critique of sources as the instrument of objectification. In the measure in which history approaches the journalistic, the standards of this critique are altered.

Every science is, as research, founded on the projection of a limited object area and is therefore necessarily specialized science. But, in the development of the projection, every specialized science must, through its procedure, separate itself into definite fields of investigation. But this separation or specialization is by no means only the unavoidable concomitant of the increasing vastness of the results of research. It is not a necessary evil, but the necessary essence of science as research. Specialization is not the consequence, but the cause of the progress of all research. In its procedure the latter does not fall apart into arbitrary investigations in which it loses itself; for modern science is determined by a third basic procedure: busy-ness.

By this we understand, first of all, the phenomenon that a science, whether a natural science or a humanistic discipline, today attains the prestige of a science only when it has become capable of being institutionalized. However, research is not busy-ness because its work is carried on in institutes; but the institutes are necessary because science as research has acquired the character of busy-ness. The procedure through which the particular object areas are mastered does not simply pile up results. Rather, with the help of its results, it always organizes itself for a new procedure. The whole of physics up to the present is contained in the mechanical apparatus which physics needs in order to smash the atom. Similarly, in historical research, the available sources can be used for the purpose of explanation only after the sources themselves have been substantiated on the basis of historical explanation. In these processes the procedure of science is circumscribed by its results. The procedure is adjusted more and more to the possibilities of the method which it has itself laid bare. This necessity of accepting its own results as determining the ways and means of the advancing method is essential to the business character of research. This, however, is what forces upon research its institutional character.

It is only in busy-ness that the projection of the object area is incorporated in the existent. All arrangements which facilitate coordination of procedures according to plan, which facilitate the checking and communication of results and regulate the exchange of talents, are measures which are by no means merely the external consequence of the fact that research work is spreading and expanding. Rather, it is a symptom, coming from far back and largely not

yet understood, that modern science is beginning to enter upon the decisive phase of its history. Only now is it taking possession of its own real nature.

What is really happening in the expansion and consolidation of the institutional character of the sciences? Nothing less than that the procedure is granted definitive precedence over Being (nature and history), which research makes objective. On the basis of this business character, the sciences provide themselves with the appropriate coherence and unity. For this reason an institutionally conducted historical or archaeological research project more closely resembles physical research that is similarly organized than it does a discipline of its own humanistic faculty which has remained in the area of mere scholarship. The decisive development of the modern business character of science therefore forms men of a different stamp. The scholar disappears. He is replaced by the research man who is engaged in research projects. This, rather than the pursuit of scholarship, gives his work its keen atmosphere. The research man no longer needs a library at home. Besides, he is always moving about. He does business at meetings and gets information at congresses. He contracts to work for commissions from publishers, who now help to determine what books must be written.

The research worker forces himself automatically into the orbit of the technologist in the form essential to his work. Only in this way does he remain effective and thus, in the sense of his age, real. Alongside him, for some time and in a few places there will continue an increasingly thin and empty romanticism of scholarship and of the university. The effective character of the university as a unifier—and hence its reality—does not consist, however, in a spiritual force which proceeds from it because it is nourished by it and preserved in it, that is, the original interrelation of the intellectual disciplines. The university is real as an organization only in a unique, because administratively self-sufficient, form which makes possible and visible the tendency of the sciences to separate into specialties, and the specific unity of these businesslike pursuits. Because the power that is of the essence of modern science takes effect immediately and unequivocally in its busy-nesses, it is only their peculiar research which can designate and organize the inner unity appropriate to them.

The real system of sciences rests on the consistency of its methods and on the attitude with respect to the objectification of Being. The advantage demanded of this system is not that it should offer an abstract and rigid unity of relations among the object areas, but

rather the greatest possible ability to switch its research—freedom of research, yet regulated mobility of transference and integration of activities with respect to whatever tasks happen to be of paramount importance. The more exclusively science becomes specialized for the complete pursuit and mastery of its work, and the more realistically these business activities are shifted to separate research institutes and professional schools, the more irrevocably the sciences move toward the fulfillment of their modern destiny. But the more unconditionally science and researchers take seriously their modern nature, the more unequivocally and the more immediately they can offer themselves for the common good, and the more unreservedly they must subordinate themselves and enter the public ambiguity of every socially useful work.

Modern science is at once founded on and specialized in the Plan of definite object areas. This Plan develops in a procedure adequate to it, certified through its discipline. Each procedure is organized as busy-ness. Plan and discipline, procedure and busy-ness, mutually postulating one another, constitute the essence of modern science, transform it into research.

We are reflecting on the nature of modern science in order to find its metaphysical basis. What conception of the existent and what concept of truth cause science to become research?

Understanding as research holds the existent to account on the question of how and how far it can be put at the disposal of available "representation." Research has the existent at its disposal if it can either calculate it in advance, in its future course, or calculate it afterwards as past. Nature—in advance calculation, history, in retrospection, calculation—is, as it were, held at bay. Nature and history become the object of expository representation, while the latter counts on nature and reckons with history. Only what thus becomes an object *is,* is recognized as existent. Science as research occurs only when it is in this objectification that the being of the existent is sought.

This objectification of the existent takes place in a re-presentation which aims at presenting whatever exists to itself in such a way that the calculating person can be secure, that is, certain of the existent. Science as research is produced when and only when truth has been transformed into such certainty of representation. In the metaphysics of Descartes the existent was defined for the first time as objectivity of representation, and truth as certainty of representation. The title of his chief work is *Meditationes de prima philosophia,* Meditations on First Philosophy. *Prote philosophia* is the designation coined by

Aristotle for what was later called metaphysics. The whole of modern metaphysics, including Nietzsche, remains within the conception of the existent and of truth initiated by Descartes.

Now, if science as research is an essential phenomenon of modern times, then whatever constitutes the metaphysical basis of research must determine, first and far in advance, the nature of modern times as such. We can see the essence of modern times in the fact that man sets himself free from the medieval bonds, by freeing himself to himself. Nevertheless, this correct characterization remains superficial. It leads to those errors which prevent our grasping the real basis of modern times, and from this, determining its full significance. It is certain that as a consequence of the liberation of man the modern age has produced subjectivism and individualism. But it is just as certain that no age before this has created a comparable objectivism, and that in no previous age did the nonindividual in the form of the collective come into its own. The essential point here is the necessary interplay between subjectivism and objectivism. It is precisely this mutual conditioning which points in turn to deeper processes.

What is decisive is not that man frees himself to himself out of his previous commitments, but that the essence of man as such changes in that man becomes a subject. To be sure, we must understand this word *subjectum* as the translation of the Greek *hupokeimenon*. The word designates what lies before us, that which gathers everything to itself to become its basis. This metaphysical meaning of the concept of subject has at first no specific relation to man and none at all to the I.

But when man becomes the first and real *subjectum,* then man becomes that existent, in which all that exists is grounded in the character of its existence and its truth. Man becomes the center to which the existent as such is related. But this is possible only if the conception of the existent as a whole is transformed. Where does this transformation appear? What, accordingly, is the essence of modern times?

When we reflect on modern times, we ask about the modern "world view." We characterize it by a contrast with the medieval and the ancient world view. But why, in the analysis of a historical period, do we ask about the world view? Does every age of history have its world view, and precisely in the sense that in each case it is concerned about its own particular world view? Or is it characteristic only of the modern type of representation to ask about the world view?

What is a world view? Obviously a view, or picture of the world.

But what does world mean here? And what does view or picture mean? World stands here as the designation of the existent as a whole. The name is not limited to the cosmos, to nature. History also is part of the world. But even nature and history, as they interpenetrate and affect one another, do not exhaust the world. In this term the foundation of the world is included, regardless of how its relation to the world is conceived.

Hence the world view would be, as it were, a painting of the existent as a whole. Yet world view means more. We mean by this the world itself, the existent as a whole, as it is for us normative and binding. View or picture means here not a copy, but the notion reflected in the idiom: we are "in the picture" with respect to something. This means the matter is present to us in so far as, in its actuality, it matters to us. To "put oneself in the picture about something" means to represent to oneself the existent itself with respect to its state and as so presented to keep it constantly before one. But one decisive aspect of the essence of the view or picture is still lacking. "We are in the picture" with respect to something does not mean only that the existent is simply presented to us, but that, in everything that belongs to it and constitutes it as a system, it stands before us. "To be in the picture" connotes having the know-how, being equipped and oriented toward the matter in question. Where the world becomes a view, the existent as a whole is posited as that with respect to which a man orients himself, which therefore he wishes to bring and have before himself and thus in a decisive sense re-present to himself. World view, properly understood, therefore means, not a view of the world, but the world understood as view. The existent as a whole is now so understood that it is existent when and only when and in the degree to which it is held at bay by the person who represents and establishes it. Where a world view arises, an essential decision takes place about the existent as a whole. The being of the existent is sought and found in the representational character of the existent.

But wherever the existent is *not* conceived of in this sense, the world cannot change into a view; there can be no world view. The fact that the existent becomes existent as representation makes the age in which this happens a new one over against the preceding one. The phrases "world view of modern times" and "modern world view" say the same thing twice and suppose something which could never before exist, namely, a medieval and an ancient world view. The world view does not change from a previous medieval to a modern one, but this fact—that the world as such becomes a view—

is the distinguishing mark of modern times. For the Middle Ages, on the other hand, the existent is the *ens creatum,* that which is created by the personal Creator-God as highest cause. To be existent here means to belong to a definite level in the order of created things, and thus caused to correspond to the cause of creation (*analogia entis*). But here the being of the existent never consists in the fact that it is brought before man as what is objective, is present and alone existent within the area susceptible to his skills and at his disposal.

The modern conception of the existent is even farther from the Greek nature. One of the oldest expressions of Greek thought about the being of the existent reads: *To gar auto noein estin te kai einai.* This statement of Parmenides means that the perception of the existent belongs to being, because it is demanded and determined by it. The existent is what rises and opens itself, that which being present comes upon man as the one who is present, that is, upon the one who opens himself to what is present by perceiving it. The existent does not become existent through the fact that only man faces it in the sense of subjective perception. Rather is it man who is faced by the existent, who is gathered into its presence by the self-disclosing. To be faced by the existent, to be drawn into its disclosure and included and so borne by it, to be harassed by its contradictions and marked by its conflict—that is the essence of man in the great age of Greece. Therefore, Greek man, in order to fulfill his nature, must collect (*legein*) the self-disclosing in its disclosure and save it (*sozein*), catch it up and preserve it, and remain exposed to all sundering confusion (*aletheuein*). The Greek man *is* as he who perceives the existent, wherefore in Greece the world cannot become a view. On the other hand, the fact that for Plato the existent character of the existent is determined as *eidos* (appearance, view) is the presupposition, coming far in advance and for a long time acting secretly and indirectly, for the eventual transformation of the world to a view.

Quite different, in contrast to the Greek perception, is the modern representation, the significance of which is best expressed by the word *representatio.* To re-present here means to bring what is present before one as something confronting oneself, to relate it to oneself, the person representing it, and to force it back into this relation to oneself as the normative area. Where this kind of thing happens, man "gets into the picture" with respect to the existent. But in so far as man thus puts himself in the picture, he puts himself into the setting, that is, into the open horizon of the universally and

openly represented. Therefore man posits himself as the setting, in which the existent must from now on represent itself, present itself, that is, be a view or picture. Man becomes the representative of the existent in the sense of the objective.

But what is new in this process by no means consists in the fact that now the viewpoint of man in the midst of the existent is simply different over and against that of medieval and ancient man. What is decisive is that man himself takes this viewpoint as produced by himself, maintains it voluntarily as that taken by himself, and as the basis of a possible development of humanity. Now, for the first time, there is such a thing as a viewpoint of man. Man takes on himself the manner in which he is to stand to the existent as the objective. That type of being-a-man begins which uses the sphere of human powers as the place for measuring and accomplishing the mastery of the existent as a whole. The age which is determined by this event is not only for retrospective reflection a new one as against the preceding one, but it asserts itself specifically as the new one. To be new is peculiar to the world which has become a view.

If, therefore, the view-character of the world has been made clear as the fact that the existent is represented, then in order to grasp fully the modern nature of representation we must feel out the original power of speech in the banal word and concept "represent": to place as present before and near one. Thus the existent assumes the position of object and only in this role does it receive the seal of being. That the world becomes a view is one and the same process with that by which man, within the existent, becomes a *subjectum.*

Only because and in so far as man as such has essentially become subject must there consequently arise for him the express question: whether it is as the I limited to his own whim and let loose for his own caprice or as the We of society, whether it is as man as individual or as community, whether it is as man as personality in society or as mere group member in the corporate body, whether it is as state and nation and people or as the universal humanity of modern man that man wants to and must be the subject which *as* a modern being he *already is.* Only where man is already essentially subject does there exist the possibility of slipping into the monstrosity of subjectivism in the sense of individualism. But only where man *remains* subject does the open battle against individualism and for the community as the goal of all achievement and usefulness have a meaning.

The interweaving of both processes—that the world becomes a view and man a *subjectum,* which is decisive for the essence of modern times—at the same time throws a light on the basic process

of modern history, which at first sight seems almost absurd. To wit: the more completely and thoroughly the conquered world stands at our disposal, the more objective the object seems to be, the more subjectively—that is, the more prominently—does the *subjectum* rise up, and the more inevitably do contemplation and explanation of the world and doctrine about the world turn into a doctrine of man, into anthropology. It is no wonder that humanism arises only when the world becomes a view. But as little as a world view was possible in the great age of Greece, so little could a humanism come into effect then. Humanism in the strict historical sense is therefore nothing but a moral-aesthetic anthropology. This term does not mean here natural scientific investigation of man. Nor does it mean the doctrine established within Christian theology about man as created, fallen, and redeemed. It designates that philosophical interpretation of man which explains and evaluates the existent as a whole from the viewpoint of and in relation to man.

The increasingly exclusive rooting of world analysis in anthropology which set in at the end of the eighteenth century finds its expression in the fact that the basic attitude of man to the existent as a whole is determined as world view *(Weltanschauung)*. Since then this term has come into common usage. As soon as the world becomes a view or picture, the attitude of man is conceived as a world view. To be sure, the phrase world view suggests the erroneous notion that it is a matter simply of an inactive contemplation of the world. It has therefore been correctly emphasized as early as the nineteenth century that world view also means—and means above all—a view of life. That nevertheless the phrase world view is asserted as the name for the attitude of man in the midst of the existent demonstrates how decisively the world became a view, as soon as man brought his life as subject into the forefront of the frame of reference. This means that the existent holds as existent only in so far as and to the extent that it is drawn into and back to this life, that it is lived through or experienced and becomes experience. As discordant as every humanism must remain to the Greek spirit, just so impossible was a medieval world view, so absurd is a catholic one. As necessarily and fittingly as everything must become experience for modern man, the more limitlessly he penetrates into the configuration of his essence, so certainly could the Greeks at the Olympian festival never have experiences.

The basic process of modern times is the conquest of the world as picture. The word "view" now means the product of representational building. In it man fights for the position in which he can be that

existent which sets the standard for all existence and forms the directive for it. Because this position is secure and itself organized and expressed as world view, the modern relation to the existent in its decisive development becomes a debate between world views—and not between world views at random, but only between those which have already taken extreme basic positions of man with the last decisiveness. For this battle of world views, and in accord with the significance of this battle, man brings into play the unlimited power of calculation, planning, and cultivation of all things. Science as research is an indispensable form of this adjustment in the world, one of the paths on which the modern age races to the fulfillment of its nature with a velocity unknown to the participants. It is only with this battle of world views that the modern age enters the definitive and probably the most persistent segment of its history.

It is a sign of this process that everywhere, in the most varied forms and disguises, the gigantic makes its appearance. In this connection the gigantic also announces itself in the direction of the ever smaller. Think of the numbers of atomic physics. The gigantic presses forward in a form which appears precisely to make it vanish: in the destruction of great distances by the airplane, in the unlimited power of representation of foreign and remote worlds, made present by the turn of a hand, through the radio. But we think too superficially if we suppose that the gigantic is simply the endlessly extended emptiness of the merely quantitative. We think too rashly if we believe that the gigantic in the form of the continuously novel springs only from the blind desire to exaggerate and to surpass. We do not think at all if we suppose we have interpreted this phenomenon of the gigantic with the catchword Americanism.

The gigantic is, rather, that through which the quantitative becomes a peculiar quality and thus a distinctive type of greatness. Every historical period differs from others not only in its greatness; it has also in each case its own concept of greatness. But as soon as the gigantic in planning and calculation and organization and affirmation shifts from the quantitative to a peculiar quality, the gigantic and that which can apparently be completely and continually calculated becomes, precisely because of this, the incalculable. This remains the invisible shadow which is cast over all things everywhere when man has become *subjectum* and the world a view.

Through this shadow the modern world projects itself into a space withdrawn from representation and so grants to the incalculable its proper determination and its historical uniqueness. But this shadow points to something else which it is denied to us of today to

know. Yet man will not be able even to experience and consider this forbidden reality so long as he wastes his time in the mere negation of his age. The flight to tradition, which combines humility and arrogance, is powerless, taken by itself, for anything except blindness and self-deception over against the historical moment.

To know, that is, to preserve in its truth, this incalculable, will be possible for man only in creative questioning and shaping of the power of true reflection. It sets the man of the future in that in-between area, in which he belongs to being and yet remains a stranger to the existent. Hölderlin knew of it. His poem which bears the superscription "To the Germans" closes:

Wohl ist enge begrenzt unsere Lebenszeit,
Unserer Jahre Zahl sehen und zählen wir,
Doch die Jahre der Völker,
Sah ein sterbliches Auge sie?

Wenn die Seele dir auch über die eigene Zeit
Sich die sehnende schwingt, trauernd verweilest du
Dann am kalten Gestade
Bei den Deinen und kennst sie nie.

Narrowly bounded is our time to live,
We see and count the number of our years,
But were the years of nations
Seen by a mortal eye?

And if your soul over your own time
Swings, the longing one, mourning you linger
On the cold shore then
Among your own and know it not.

—*Translated by Marjorie Grene*

THE AIMS OF EDUCATION

3. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN AIMS

T. S. Eliot

We have already observed that the term "education" has become more difficult of definition as a result of social changes in the last three or four hundred years. We may distinguish four important phases. In the first, we were concerned only with the training of a small minority for certain learned professions. In the second, with the refinement of culture, we were concerned with the education of the gentleman, or of the *honnête homme;* and at the same time, with the supply of the rudiments of literacy to a humbler stratum of society. During the nineteenth century, the minds of educators were largely occupied with the problem of extending the benefits, or supposed benefits, of education as then understood, to an increasing number of the population. The problem was apparently simple: men still thought that they knew what education was—it was what a part of the community had been receiving; and so long as this education could be supplied to increasing numbers, educators felt that they were on the right road. But today we realize that we have come near enough to the end of expansion to be faced with a wholly new problem. It is parallel to the end of geographical expansion. In the nineteenth century, the United States was still pushing westward; European nations were still staking claims for themselves in colonial empire. Now the area of geographical expansion is over—at least, by the methods employed in the previous century. In the nineteenth century, there seemed also to be only the problem of educating more of the members of society. But now we are at a stage at which we are not simply trying to educate more people—we are already committed to providing everybody with something called education. We are coming to the end of our educational frontier. Long ago we decided

that everybody must be taught to read, write, and cipher; and so long as there were large numbers who could not read, write, or cipher, we did not need to look too closely into the question of what education meant. Every stage of development of our society presents us not only with new, but with more difficult problems, as well as with the same problems in more difficult forms: for we have now to cope with a new illiteracy, and a much more difficult illiteracy to overcome—namely, the illiteracy of that part of the population which has had its elementary schooling but has become illiterate through lack of occasion to use what it has been taught. This secondary illiteracy is a new phenomenon. It is aggravated by the effect of radio and cinema, and by the replacement, in popular periodicals, of words by pictures. I am convinced that readers in England—readers of *anything*—can be classified partly according to the size of type to which they can give attention. One can say that the educated man is one who can read the reports of Parliamentary debates, and the reports of important law cases, from beginning to end—skipping intelligently, of course. There is a larger number who can read a few paragraphs, if the type is large enough. There is an increasing proportion of the population which can read only headlines, of any part of a newspaper not concerned with sport or crime.

This is a kind of parenthesis, illustrative of the fact that even illiteracy—even analphabetism—is not a problem that can be finished with and written off. My point is that now that we are committed to giving everybody formal instruction, everything must be called into question and examined—the forms, the subject matter, the methods, the purposes. So we have always new problems, and the old ones in new forms.

What happens in our thinking about education is, of course, only a special instance of what is happening to human consciousness. In the world today we find ourselves more and more trying consciously to manipulate what had been left to take its own course—that is, our area of conscious manipulation becomes bigger and bigger. A problem comes into existence through our ability to become aware of it; the awareness shapes the problem; and once we are conscious of a problem, we cannot dismiss it from consciousness; we find ourselves under obligation to try to find an answer.

By an "educational system"—whether we are considering a particular institution, or the general organization of instruction in which we can distinguish national characteristics—we mean something which is a compound of *growth* and *construction*. I accept the view which refers to "the relativity of educational theory and practice to a pre-

vailing order," and I agree with Professor Adolf Lowe when he says:

> . . . no system of education can be truly appreciated or criticized except against the background of the social order in which it operates. The reason for this is that education always serves a social purpose, even if both teacher and pupil are unaware of the fact and experience the educational contact as an entirely spontaneous undertaking. Actually at each stage, from elementary to university education, powerful social forces are at work, moulding the maturing individual according to a pattern, thus aiming at creating a definite human type.[1]

I have only two comments to make on this quotation: first, that the "powerful social forces" may be *more* or *less* conscious; and may consist of the influence of a dominant class, or of a prevailing attitude towards life of the society as a whole, or they may be concentrated, in a totalitarian regime, in the deliberate aims of the leaders of a political party. Second, we must recognize that the system of education in every country is the product of history, and reflects the history, and responds to the temperament, of that people. In so far as a system of education is something shaped by the conscious aims of a few men—whether these men are organizing the education of their own people, or creating a system for some more backward race—there is always grave danger of borrowing or imposing something which does not fit the ethos, the way of life, the habits of thought and feeling of that people. In America we have seen different aims and methods promoted by educators biased by an enthusiasm for German, or French, or English systems of education, respectively—educators who were sometimes themselves partly educated in one or other of these countries. The intellectual formation of a man like President Eliot of Harvard, himself partly the product of the German system, led, I think, to an exaggerated application of German methods. On the other hand, I think it is very likely that the model of English institutions in India, and of Western educational methods in the East in general, was too hurriedly and confidently imposed. But the confusion of the imitation of various European systems in America, and of Western—including American—methods in the East, is now in danger of becoming more general, as every part of the world becomes more aware of every other; as the concentration of wealth and power shifts from one nation to another; and as a greater uniformity of culture seems likely to result from the pressure of one civilization upon another.

In the changes of which I have been speaking, in the continual

[1] Lowe, *The Universities in Transformation* (Christian News Letter Books No. 9, London, Macmillan).

enlargement of the area of human planning, it is apparent that we are living in an age in which *construction* has priority over *growth.* This is a development which we must accept. We have not time to wait, or to leave things to be fought out between various natural forces. We live in an age when towns have to be designed, when we have to have regulations about the type of building, the height of building, and the uses to which building may be put, in every city area. And in such an age we also find ourselves obliged to be more conscious about what we are doing in our educational institutions. Only we must remember that being more conscious about everything is a very great strain, for it imposes a greater and greater responsibility upon fewer and fewer people. The psychological and physiological strain upon the member of a government cabinet today, the strain of being head of a government, or even secretary of state or foreign minister, is almost greater than any human being should be asked to bear.

We must be prepared then, so far ahead as we can descry anything, for a tendency to universal standardization in education everywhere. When, a couple of years ago, it was announced that an agreement had been reached for standardization of nuts and bolts between Britain and the United States, so that we should be able to buy a nut in one country and fit it to a screw in the other, the announcement appeared in very small print, but it struck me as the most important news of the day. It was also a portent. And the other thing for which we must be prepared is greater and greater intervention and control of education by the State. And when I say "the State," I do not mean Illinois or any other state—I mean the central government in every country. It has been formally a fact in certain European countries; but in all countries I think that the State is likely to find itself more obliged to pay the piper, and therefore more impelled to call the tune.

There are obvious material reasons for this. Educational institutions, especially the big universities, become more and more expensive to run. They become bigger, they need always more buildings, more staff, and their maintenance involves a higher and higher proportion of administrative and financial work. They need bigger and bigger libraries and museums; more and better laboratories; and scientific equipment becomes more and more elaborate and costly. At the same time, the endowments bring diminishing returns, and the private sources from which new endowments flowed are running dry. In the end, perhaps bankruptcy might lead to the universities' having to be taken over by the State or closed down. But on the other

hand, the central governments become more and more interested in what the universities do. I am, I ought to say, thinking of conditions in Britain: how far these observations apply to conditions in America is for you to judge. The British government, owing to the great expansion of the Civil Service, is a very large employer of labor: the requirements of the Civil Service become more varied and specialized, and must be satisfied by recruits from all the universities. Also, every government today is more and more concerned with the advances of science in such ways as the governments find needful. If the universities are not equipped to pursue the kind of research, and provide men trained in the specialties that the governments require, then the universities must be provided with the funds—and directed in the use of them.

Nobody dislikes totalitarian government more than I do; but it is not enough merely to hate it, or to concentrate our detestation upon its uglier manifestations elsewhere. We must at least recognize the existence of pressures which are modifying society everywhere, if only in order to be alert to counteract them and to accept nothing that we can do without. Not all men are moved by unscrupulous love of power, or by fanatical ideology: men sometimes find themselves in a position where they have to assume more power than they want—or in a position in which the assumption of power may plausibly seem to be the only way of meeting some crisis or relieving some intolerable situation. And if it comes to seem more and more important for the centralized State to control every branch of instruction, to exercise the ultimate control, then the "social purpose" of education will come to be identified with the "social purpose" of the head of the department of State responsible for education.

I have been following a rather tortuous course to lead to a question which really started me on it. In what I wrote about education several years ago, a critic finds an inconsistency. He says, "Mr. Eliot's chief complaint of other writers on education is that they seek to use the schools to achieve social purposes they have at heart. Then he falls into the pit he has digged for others: he wants to use the schools to advance social purposes of his own." Now, I do not think that anybody can think seriously about education who is devoid of social purposes of his own; and I am sure that these social purposes will guide him towards some of his conclusions about education. For anyone who denies that education should have a social purpose will be omitting something without which it is not education. But I think that anyone who considers education in relation to social purpose should try to be quite clear as to what social purposes guide his own

theory of education; which are peculiar to himself, or to a group whose views are not shared by some other group; which he believes to apply to the society to which he and his sympathizers belong; and which, if any, apply to every society.

What I have been saying before, therefore, was intended to elicit the fact that the meaning of the term "social purpose" is subject to a good deal of variation. In a liberal democracy it should mean something discernible in the mind and temperament of the people as a whole, something arising out of its common ethos, which finds expression through a variety of intellectual leaders holding varied and sometimes conflicting opinions. In a totalitarian society, it may mean something formulated in the brains of a few persons in power, deduced from a particular political-social theory, and imposed by every means of compulsion and indoctrination, so that it may in time become integrated into the common ethos. This is a very different kind of social purpose. In a liberal society every writer on the subject will have some social purpose of his own; something he wishes to retain, restore, or introduce through the means of education. Therefore he should know himself how far his assumptions are his own, and how far he is justified in assuming that they are shared by all intelligent men of good will. He should, in short, examine his premises.

Now as education, it has been agreed, has several aims, the social purposes have to be guarded from interfering with the other aims; and also, we have to allow for the possibility that we may have several social purposes which have to be reconciled with each other. I remind you of the sage words of Gustave Thibon and Simone Weil which I quoted at the end of my last address. I shall take as an illustration "the ideal of equality of opportunity," because my previous reservations on the applicability of that ideal seem to have provoked especially strong dissent. This ideal certainly expresses a social purpose, and is equally applicable to other things than education: education is merely one of the benefits to which men and women should ideally have equal opportunity. This ideal has two very strong grounds of appeal, which must be distinguished. One is that ability is wasted, of which society has need, through our failing to recognize and train it. This is a utilitarian argument; it has force, but of a very different kind from the second. This is, that it is not just that any person should be prevented, by our failure to educate him, from the full development of his latent powers and faculties. The second seems to me the more universal and compelling, because it is a *moral* ground. Now on this ground at least, the assertion that every child should have equal opportunity for education is one which nobody will deny. The only difficulty comes when we proceed, from cherishing this ideal, to

attempt to realize it; and when we give it priority, in our educational schemes, over other ideals of education.

If we pursued the ideal of equality of opportunity rigorously we should, it seems to me, have to see to it that no educational institution was superior to any other professing to supply the same grade of education. We should certainly have to see to it that no institution gave a better education simply because it could charge higher fees, and select its pupils for any other reason than intellectual promise. To what extent do the pupils at expensive private schools get a better education? What is it that their parents are paying for? I know that the motives from which most affluent parents choose a school are often motives which have nothing to do with education. There is the desire that their children should mix with other children of the same economic status and social type; there is also the calculation that their children will make the sort of friends who will be "useful" to them in later life; there is also the simple snobbism attached to the name of a particular school or university. But there are better reasons than these: there is the attraction of a foundation with traditions, and a long list of distinguished alumni. And there is the best reason of all, especially for the private school—for it is in school days that this reason is the most cogent: the parents know that their child will be a member of a small group, that he will be taught in a class of fifteen or twenty instead of in a class of forty or fifty. Anyone who has ever tried to teach young children knows that the larger your class is, beyond fifteen or twenty, the less you can teach.

It is certainly desirable that every school in the country should have enough accommodation, and enough teachers, to be able to teach children in smaller groups. I thought, in 1944, that the British Education Act of that year—an attempt, certainly, to improve state education—put the wrong things first. Instead of extending immediately the years of compulsory education, and thus adding to the number of pupils, we should in my opinion have aimed first at the supply of more teachers and accommodation for those already in the state-supported or -aided schools; and undertaken to give better teaching than we do, to those under fourteen. But when will we, in any country, provide the money for this reform? Again, before we train more teachers, we ought to consider whether we are paying our present teachers adequately. I have never worked in a coal mine, or a uranium mine, or in a herring trawler; but I know from experience that working in a bank from 9:15 to 5:30, and once in four weeks the whole of Saturday, with two weeks' holiday a year, was a rest cure compared to teaching in a school.

I am told that "no American advocate of equality of opportunity

would argue that the rich should be forbidden to set up schools of their own, which might turn out to be superior to those supported by the State." This is advocacy of a limited equality, an equality qualified by a good deal of inequality. If the schools established by the rich for the rich turn out to be better schools (though I do not believe this is altogether true) then what becomes of equality of opportunity? And how can we limit our equality to an equal opportunity to get a good education? If one child has better opportunities in life than another, merely because his parents are richer, will not many people regard this situation as unjust? It would seem that inequality in education is merely a special instance of inequality in general, and if we affirm a principle in one area are we not driven to accept it in all? Certainly, some English advocates of equality in education would go much further than, as I am told, American advocates do: they would abolish the private school and the privately endowed institution, or bring them all into the state system.

The usefulness of the phrase "equality of opportunity" is confused by the various meanings which we attach to the word "opportunity"—it means different things to different people, and different things to the same people at different moments, often without our knowing it. That everyone should, as far as we can make it possible, be able to pursue the activity for which he is best fitted, is an aim which we can all applaud. One has sometimes observed the son of people in well-to-do circumstances, admirably qualified by talent and temperament to be a first-rate garage mechanic, yet never having the opportunity to become one. Pressure of family and environment, the acquirement of tastes incompatible with the occupation for which he is best fitted, and perhaps also a defective education, usually stand in his way. I am afraid that to most people at most times "opportunity" means a good many other things than the opportunity to develop the latent powers and capacities: it means opportunity to make money, to acquire a higher social status, to have power over others. For some young women, opportunity means opportunity to get a screen test; and only a small number of those who crave this opportunity deserve it. In short, opportunity is an empty term unless we can answer the question "opportunity for what?"

It would seem, then, that most of the time, when we talk of "equality of opportunity," we either do not know what we mean, or do not mean what we say, or else are driven to conclusions from which most people would shrink. It is avoiding the issue if we assume vaguely that "inequality" means only the injustice of overprivileged and underprivileged social classes. It may happen that a child at a

public school finds a teacher who will elicit his aptitude for a particular subject, and that a child at an expensive private school has just the wrong teacher. But what about overprivileged and underprivileged areas in the same country? A poor state or country may not be able to provide such good equipment or teachers, such good libraries or laboratories, as a richer one. Should not that inequality be redressed also? Thus the claim of equality of opportunity, if pressed to its logical conclusion, seems to me to lead inescapably to a universal and exclusive state system of education, to the cost of which the richer parts of the country, like the richer individuals, will contribute proportionately, but from which they will derive only the same educational returns as their poorer neighbors. And next, is it just that the citizens of a wealthy or advanced nation should have greater opportunity for education than those of a backward one? Unless we maintain that some races or peoples are superior to others we seem to be forced toward the goal of a world system of education. And finally, if we are to have complete equality of opportunity in education, it seems to follow that we must have a uniform system for grading the intelligence of pupils, so that each shall receive just the kind and amount of education to which his gifts entitle him.

If, as I have suggested, the thoroughgoing application of the principle of equal opportunity (reinforced by the other pressures of which I have spoken) tends towards increased control by the State, then the State will have something to say about opportunity. It will find itself limiting opportunity to those vocations which serve the ends of the State as conceived by those who happen to control the State. I am not suggesting that it would, in a Western democracy, reach the point of direction of labor; but by offering greater inducements and advantages and facilities in one direction rather than another, it might tend to limit education to the kinds of training which served the immediate purposes of the State.

The idea of equal opportunity, it would seem, has to be considered in relation to each of the three aims of education from which we started; and it might be that in this connection, also, one aim would be pursued in such a way as to interfere with another. The difficulty arises from the fact that we cannot, in practice, wholly separate one from another. There have been, no doubt, men who were animated by curiosity and the thirst for knowledge, to such a degree as to be able to pursue their studies quite apart from their actual calling in life. There have been Spinozas who, in order to be free to exercise a wholly unremunerative activity and one not regarded by the world as particularly useful, have been content to earn a modest livelihood

by grinding lenses. There have been other men, in humble positions, in whom the speculative or contemplative motive has been so strong that they found happiness in this double life. On the other hand, there have been men so completely limited in interest to the duties of their occupation that they have seemed to be hardly more than machines. Most men escape from this only by way of recreations and hobbies, ordinarily of a rather trivial nature. The ideal is a life in which one's livelihood, one's function as a citizen, and one's self-development all fit into and enhance each other. For most of us, the full pursuit of any of these aims must interfere with another; and we are obliged, at best, to make almost day-to-day calculations and decisions between the several claims. We are all limited, by circumstances if not by capacities. To get anything you want you find you have to sacrifice something else that you want; and in getting it, you find that you have to accept other things that you do not want. Yet we must maintain that a man is not educated if he is merely trained to a trade or profession; that he has to play his part as a citizen; and that, as a citizen, to be something more than a voting machine, and, as a worker, to be something more than a working machine, he must be trained and developed to something more than citizenship and work. And we find that the principle of "equal opportunity" is meaningless—that is, susceptible of being interpreted by everybody in terms of what he *desires,* instead of what he ought to desire—unless we answer the question "opportunity for what?"

There are obviously some "opportunities" which ought to be available to everyone. Every man should have the opportunity of earning a livelihood in reasonable and decent conditions; of marrying and rearing a family who will also have the same opportunity; of rest and recreation, and so forth. You will observe that this sentence is made up of terms which will have different meanings in different social contexts: it is necessarily vague. But when we proceed beyond material necessities we get into a region of values. And so the assertion of "equal opportunity" leads us gradually to the point at which we must know what we mean by "the good life." The question "What is education?" or the question "What is the aim of education?" leads us to this point. Now it is unlikely that we shall all agree on an answer to the final question, "What is Man?" Therefore, what we mean in practice by "education" will be the highest common factor of what enough educated people mean by it. So you may say that "education" is likely to mean, in practice, a compromise between what different people mean by it.

I hope that it is by now clear that I do not complain of other writers that "they seek to use the schools to achieve social purposes which they have at heart." When we talk about education, we cannot stop at education as if it were a field which we could close off; an area in which we could come to agreement whatever our differences of philosophy. We must have a social purpose in education, and therefore, if we talk about education, we must be prepared to make clear to ourselves and to our hearers what our social purpose is. But the social purpose itself should not spring from a prejudice, an emotional bias in favor of equality or hierarchy, a bias in favor of freedom or of order. Nor is the social purpose in itself enough, for it does not take account of the whole nature of man.

We have seen that, just as we are led, the moment we begin to think seriously about education, to think about citizenship, so thinking about citizenship leads us to something beyond citizenship; for the good citizen in the end turns out to be the good man; and that leads wherever the whole problem of ethics is going to take us. Now a view of education such as Dr. Joad's, which suggests that training for citizenship and training for the development of one's latent powers and faculties can be carried on in separate departments, may seem clear enough about the discipline for citizenship, but offers no general prescription for the development, or we may say "the improvement" of man as man. As citizens, men must hold certain principles in common, and must agree on certain social habits; the fact of having to get on with other people imposes some discipline. But in the question of the development of latent powers, this view does not proceed to maintain that there are certain latent powers for good, and certain latent powers for evil, in man as man; it suggests rather, that each man has latent powers and faculties peculiar to himself, illustrated by the various ways in which men spend their leisure time. It is perfectly true that some men have an aptitude for and take enjoyment in doing their own repairs about the house; whereas others are much better advised to send for a plumber, a carpenter, or an electrician. I have no doubt that when Dr. Joad talks of latent powers and faculties, he is thinking of higher powers and faculties than those of the handy man. Nevertheless, he is leaving the area of latent powers and faculties uncontrolled. The danger of separation between the social and the private life—which has the corollary that the only criterion of morals is whether one's conduct is harmful to one's neighbors, and that every man should be free to do as he likes with *himself*—is that the social code, the code of citizenship, will

become more and more constrictive, more and more exercising a pressure towards *conformity;* and that this public servitude to society will be compensated by extreme license in whatever conduct is supposed to be none of society's business.

It is true that in a society organized on this principle the social may prove in the end to encroach more and more upon the private. In a society organized to carry out this principle, the rules of matrimony and sexual relations may be, at first, much relaxed. But then it may be found that this relaxation has undesirable social consequences —that it affects the birth rate unfavorably, in a nation which finds that it needs more workmen and soldiers; or that it has an unfortunate effect upon the children, who may begin to show psychological aberrations, or may grow up to be less desirable citizens than the government wants them to be: and then private life will be interfered with in the name of society. People may be ordered to have larger families, or to have no families at all, according to whether they are judged to be suitable breeders of future citizens. Thus the individual may find his privacy, his opportunity for exercising his moral freedom and responsibility gradually taken away from him in the name of society.

The restoration of a kind of order in people's private lives, however, when it is made in the name of a social purpose only, furthers the reduction of men to machines, and is the opposite from the development of their humanity. The assumption that you can have areas of control, and areas of complete freedom, must lead either to a suffocating uniformity of order, or to chaos. The actual degree of freedom or control may differ between one area and another. We are all more willing to submit to regulation of our public than of our private behavior, and gradually, with the increasing complexity of modern civilization, we are prepared to submit to more and more regulations in the public interest. There are still people who object to being vaccinated, but few people now resent being isolated when they have typhoid fever. Most people recognize that the state of their drains is a matter in which they have a duty to their neighbors; though not everybody recognizes that he has the same duty in respect to the noise of his radio set. In an apartment house, one expects to have less freedom in many petty details of life than in a solitary cottage in the country. On the other hand, people in England since the war have objected, and they have my sympathy, to being forbidden to set up a tool shed in a country garden without a license from the government, or to being forced to employ a workman to do what they are capable of doing themselves. Fortunately, we do not yet

submit to universal regulation in the public interest; and fortunately, we are still capable of being shocked by private behavior, even when it does not appear to injure anyone but the culprit himself. And so long as we are capable of resenting control, and of being shocked by other people's private lives, we are still human. We are, at least, recognizing that man is something more than merely a social animal: that there should be limitations to social control. And by being shocked (when it is something more than a prejudice that is shocked) we are recognizing, however dimly, that there is some law of behavior which is something more than a duty to the State.

What, then, should we mean by the development of the individual's latent powers and faculties, if we go further than Dr. Joad, and consider the individual, not as if he were a seed out of a packet with no name on it, which we plant and tend out of curiosity to see what it will become, and what sort of flower or fruit it will bear; but as a seed of a known plant which has been cultivated for many generations—a plant about which we know what its flower or fruit ought to be, if it receives the right nurture and grows to perfection? How are we to try to educate good men, seeing that the idea of the good citizen implies the good man? Are we to be content with a rough-and-ready description of the good citizen, leaving everybody to define goodness according to his own taste and fancy? As you may have feared, this question raises for me the final question, that of the relation of education to religion.

FAUST — A Masque

Elder Olson

CHARACTERS

FAUST
MEPHISTOPHELES
DOCTOR POLIO-ANTHRAX
CHORUS OF SERVING-MEN and PEASANTS
YOUNG SERVING-MAN
OLD SERVING-MAN
MAIDSERVANT
CHORUSES

TIME: *the Present, just at the moment it is changing into the Future.*

PLACE: *the Castle of* FAUST. *The first Chorus is spoken before a curtain with a painted castle on it, dark except for a lighted window in the tower room. When the curtain is drawn, Faust's study is disclosed. The second Chorus is spoken before the same curtain; but the dialogue of the* OLD *and the* YOUNG SERVING-MEN *takes place before a curtain painted with a stair ascending to the tower. The castle door should of course be something one can knock upon and open.*

Everything about the castle should suggest an autumn-like decay; not bright autumn, but the decadent, patched and peeled, sallow and moldy season. The clothes of the characters should be ragged and faded.

The Choruses may perhaps be divided among individual speakers.

CHORUS

Shut the gates, bar the doors, close the shutters: there is great evil outside.
There is great evil within: keep all doors unlocked, all openings open: this place is a trap.
What is the terror without or the terror within?
We do not know, we know only the terror,
Fear of the eerie hour between dog and wolf,

And all the hours of changing sun and moon.
Fear falls with the sunlight on the empty courtyard,
Fear at nightfall rises like mist from the stones
And stalks about the castle in the shapes of our history.
All winds blow fear to the fearful, disaster to the doomed,
Defeat to the defeated; to the ill-starred all omens are ominous.

We are the poor: we enter into all plays,
For us all plays are the same; no one denies us
Our part, a small part, and always the same.
To watch, to lament, to cheer; to be beaten, starved, deceived.
Such as we are only hands and feet,
The artificial souls of brooms and plows.
We are only the audience by chance involved in the action,
As when the stage-fire kindles the theater.

This is the night of crisis, famously prophesied: many strange riders over heaven and earth,
Rumblings of great battles underground,
Collisions of cloud-armies overhead.
We have seen the flash and smelt the sulphurous smoke.
What can we do, what do? Nothing, nothing;
We can eat the bread of poverty, with fright for salt.
We can watch and whisper, we can whisper and wait.

Now we have come to watch that lighted window
Where a man sits who must act for all of us.
Because our fates are shadows of his fate,
We watch and whisper in terror of a prophecy
That tonight of all nights he will fail us.
A thousand times he has failed us, a thousand times we have borne the burden of his failures
With no event but the agony of the burden,
But no stair goes on forever, upwards or downwards,
There is always one last step, concluding something, for good or for evil,
Each role can be played once too often, once too often
The victim tempts the murderer, the murderer stalks his victim once too often.
Tonight if he fails, man will be man no longer:
The wind and the rain will play upon this stage

But man no longer; man will turn beast; there will be beasts, not men.

Is this true? Is it false? We do not know; we know only
Restlessness of swine at the changing of the wind,
Anxiety of horses in the stable
While the fire is yet but a strangeness in the straw.
We are wary, we are accustomed to deception from our cradle,
The honeyed finger for tit, the faked maidenhead, the statesman's promise,
The little rouge that makes the dead look healthy.
Only our fear spoke truth; our fear has kept faith with us; wary as we are,
We believe the screams of the child brought down by the wolves,
The cries of the girl caught on the marsh-path by the soldiers.

(*There is a long, marrow-thrilling scream, rising higher and higher like a soprano's high note.*)

MAIDSERVANT. A dreadful thing went past me up the stair;
I think it was our Future.

(*It is, however,* MEPHISTOPHELES *going up to* FAUST'S *study. He comes into the study unnoticed by* FAUST, *too early for his cue, and dawdles about the room, obviously very bored.* FAUST, *in sorcerer's conical cap and long gown marked with magical symbols, is just finishing a Latin invocation to the devil.*)

FAUST. Per Jehovam, Gehennam, et consecratam aquam quam nunc spargo, signumque crucis quod nunc facio, et per vota nostra, ipse nunc surgat nobis dicatus Mephistophilis!
Now, my Past, be dead: here through this door
Enters my Future.

(MEPHISTOPHELES *goes languidly to the door; there is a bright flash and a report; as the smoke clears away, he seems to come through the door. He is now wearing a* FAUST *mask.*)

FAUST. My self! My self!
MEPHISTOPHELES. Why not?
Summon what you will, nothing answers but your image.
Echo is always your own voice, the Future is always a mirror
To which you advance, only to find your reflection.

FAUST. I have knocked at the doors of Hell, and my self has answered.
Who stands before me?

MEPH. I am the one you called
I am said to have many names, to make sure of summons,
Answer to all of them eagerly. (*Removes* FAUST *mask*)

FAUST. Are you the Demon of Water?
(*A green light falls on* MEPHISTOPHELES)

MEPH. Even so.

FAUST. What is your speed and power?

MEPH. Quick enough at turning a sailor's wife into a widow; quicker at turning a Jew or a Mussulman into a Christian than at turning the dirty into the clean; not half so fast as alcohol at turning a prude into a whore, but excellent as something to sail boats in.

FAUST. Too weak, too slow.
Demon of Earth, appear!
(*A dark light on* MEPHISTOPHELES)

MEPH. Here I am.

FAUST. What is your speed and power?

MEPH. To lie still as a sleeping tortoise and yet to fly in great rings around the sun, like a fly round a hot honeycake; yes, and to be at all funerals at once, and to keep the dead from interrupting the grief of the hired mourners.

FAUST. Too weak, too slow.
Demon of Air, appear!
(*A blue light on* MEPHISTOPHELES)

MEPH. At your service.

FAUST. What is your speed and power?

MEPH. To lie at the mountain's foot and soar above its head, too; yes, and to sit on the ocean at the same time; in short, to be in many places at once, invisibly, and to be missed sooner than anything when I am absent.

FAUST. Too weak, too slow.
Demon of Fire, appear!
(*A red light on* MEPHISTOPHELES)

MEPH. Present, present.

FAUST. What is your speed and power?

MEPH. Why, to rise all at once tall as a cloud out of nothing, like a genie smoking out of a bottle, and to make women and even old bachelors leave off dressing. To make a cow into a dish, a house into a chimney, a cigarette into a smoke, and a flea-bitten fanatic into a holy martyr.

FAUST. Too weak, too slow—all too weak and slow!
Where is the demon with the speed of thought——?

MEPH. Of *human* thought?

FAUST. Yes, with the quickness of man's mind—

MEPH. Why, I am here before you—or rather, shall be, if you have the patience. For I am the slowest thing in the world, or rather, that would be in the world, if I could ever make speed enough to catch up with it. Socrates and Plato and Aristotle kept school twenty-five hundred years ago, and I am still wetting my pencil to take down the first lesson. I am longer at coming to a conclusion than a timid chess-player. If you want anything of me, write it out, I beg you, for it will be easier for me to learn to read than for you to speak so slowly that I can follow you.
What do you want with all these devils, anyway?
What's your motive?

FAUST. I had once, I think, some noble motive—I have forgotten it.
But I am human; therefore, let us say,
Lust, greed, ambition, rage, fear.

MEPH. Devils enough behind you, and you want more before you. But it's speed you want; one moment, and I'll set the fastest devil of all before you.

FAUST. What is his speed?

MEPH. Speed, speed—why, as fast as misery follows upon folly—there's nothing faster in the world.

FAUST. His power?

MEPH. You'll know that soon enough, that's the beauty of his speed.

(*A tremendous crash upon cymbal and kettledrum*)

Well?

FAUST. I—I see—There is something in your countenance—
Are all these many devils, then, but one?

MEPH. As the same death's head under all human faces;
Your eyes lie, that say otherwise. And now, observe—

(*Lifts his mask*)

FAUST. Nothing—nothing but the wall behind; no, not even that:
Absolute emptiness; like starless space; nothing at all;
Nothing. Nothing is too dreadful; I refuse to believe in Nothing.
Nothing is the hedge without a further side,
No horse will jump it; it is the hanged man's dancing-floor,
The broken stair that leads nowhere, like the sheer brink of the world.
It is entirely too nonexistent to be contemplated.

MEPH. If many can be one, why shouldn't one be nothing?
But have it as you wish. *(Restores mask)*

FAUST. Look, devil, be whoever you will—

MEPH. I am an unemployed satirist; when all's ridiculous there's nothing to laugh at.

FAUST. I have desires and I have power to accomplish them. I have profoundly studied—

MEPH. Philosophy—

FAUST. Philosophy—

MEPH. Theology—

FAUST. Theology—

MEPH. Mathematics—

FAUST. Mathematics—

MEPH. Metaphysics—

FAUST. Metaphysics—

MEPH. Physics—

FAUST. Physics—

MEPH. Ethics—

FAUST. Ethics—

MEPH. Politics—

FAUST. Politics—

MEPH. And Jurisprudence, and have all these years—

FAUST. Led my students hither and thither by the nose—

MEPH. "Und bin so klug als wie zuvor."

FAUST. What is that you are saying? You seem to pluck
The words out of my soul . . . I have a curious feeling, almost a premonition . . .

MEPH. Almost a premonition, but more like a memory—

FAUST. But more like a memory—

MEPH. As if all this had happened before.
FAUST. As if all this had happened before . . .
This is incredible, it's like an enchanted glass
Showing the reflection before the thing appears
That is reflected.
MEPH. All human action has been repetition,
But no stair goes on forever, upwards or downwards,
There is always one last step, concluding something, for good or for evil.
Come, now, look at me.
FAUST. O God, I look on the pure absolute Evil.
MEPH. Purity even in evil is difficult.
The fatal jewel, all with hell-fires burning,
Is still no common pebble. Look at me, I say, at my eyes, now:
Do you remember nothing?
FAUST. I remember a season like a noble tapestry faded,
Fountains blowing, and swans, and a running stag,
And a child crying, or a woman—or is it the wind?
MEPH. Back, back in Time, I say: do you remember?
FAUST. I remember dreams and broken promises—I could weep to think of them.
Royal summer a beggar and in rags,
Great courts come to nothing, the kings and the magicians fallen,
Bright armor rusted, the last string of the lute snapping,
All greatness turned to a legend whereat I could weep as at an old ballad sung by a blind minstrel.
MEPH. Enough romancing—think, now, and remember.
FAUST. How one grovels like an animal in pain among one's memories!
MEPH. Ah—!
FAUST. I tell you, devil—
MEPH. Yes?
FAUST. I think there is much to this talk of a Recording Angel.
Believe me, there is something in us
—The soul perhaps—sits like a clerk at his desk,
Scribing and summing all. I see something, devil—
MEPH. Of you and me?
FAUST. Of the Past, how beautiful, how perfect!
Marvelously unfolding, like a golden arras woven with many scenes,

Like the peacock his translucent fans unfolding,
Like—

MEPH. Death and hell! Do you mean to say—?
No faults, eh, no mistakes?

FAUST. No fault, none.

MEPH. Why, you are damned; damned truly; damned indeed;
To be truly damned is to do, like the sad ghost in the castle,
Over and over again the selfsame wrong,
And have past error grow all future action.
That gives the ghost his ghostliness;
To be so, is to be a mist shaped like a man,
And murder shadows, and dissolve at cockcrow
When all else renews life.
What, do you think Time's endless?
Do you think the clock counts nothing?
Come, come: remember.

FAUST. Beautiful and sad as the tale of Merlin and Arthur read in the autumn gardens, amid the falling leaf,
The splendid wars, the sweet lusts—

MEPH. God forgive you;
You are in love with human wickedness.

FAUST. This vision confirms me, fixes my wandering thought.
Look, devil, I'll have back my youth,
I'll stand again in the light of that fallen day.
I'll not die, surrounded only by white hairs,
Of that most dreadful sickness, sour old age,
I will live my life over again.

MEPH. Over! Over!
—Will you play nothing but the old play over and over?
Do you remember nothing of you and me,
The thousands of times we have played out this dull play,
The draughty theaters, the carted stages,
The puppet stalls where ignorant children clapped—

FAUST. —And therefore I have summoned you—

MEPH. What, summoned?
Summoned, you say?

FAUST. —By my magic—

MEPH. Magic? You?
I came because the script demanded it,

Because you and I are puppets, and move when plucked,
And do not move when not plucked—do you hear?

FAUST. —And in this bargain I will pledge my soul—

MEPH. —Soul? Soul? What's that? You a soul?
Give me an arm, a leg, a tooth, even an eyelash,
Never your soul. A soul?—listen, Faustus,
you know nothing of soul.
The soul is choice: you know desire, not choice.
The soul is action; you know only motion.
A soul, indeed! That's the flaw, you are medieval still,
Conceive the world still as some central stage,
Yourself upon it, the star, the principal figure,
Playing to the packed galleries of heaven,
And pulled this way or that by God or me,
A sort of tug of war, to obtain—your soul.
—Listen, neither of us is getting any younger,
The time wears, the play wearies, half the scenery is wrecked already, half the audience has gone home, we must both take thought of the future.
I came proposing a change in the old story:
Man is obsolete; he must evolve or die;
Somehow the new creature must take shape
To inhabit the altering world—what do you say, will you risk it?

FAUST. Devil, I say that I will have my youth,
Cost what it may.

MEPH. There's your true revolutionary for you,
Pulls the house down to rid it of a fly,
Then builds it as before.
O, I have heard
That it was through intending such stupidity
Heaven's highest angel fell.
Well—as you will.
But keep your soul to take to church on Sundays.

(*Darkness. Gradually a weird glow comes back into the room, revealing* MEPHISTOPHELES *and* FAUST *standing as before.* FAUST *is unchanged. The light grows stronger as the scene proceeds, until the room is quite bright.*)

FAUST. Young, now? I am young? I am young again?

MEPH. If you doubt it, go and look—there's a mirror.

(*The light picks out a large pier glass, rolled on scene during the blackout*)

FAUST. (*On his way to mirror*) I knew it—Oh, I knew it! This bold seething of the blood,
The rich impulsive blood through every vein!
This sharpening of the vision and all sense!
The strong knock of the heart against the ribs,
The warming of the limbs—the body, that proud animal,
Restrung to strength and quickness! Devil, devil,
You cannot know how loathsome is old age;
The spirit imprisoned in a sickening beast
Like fiery Ariel in the pine; all its strange music,
All its quivering brilliance stilled, stilled,
Kept secret from the world which passes by
And knows it not—I am young? I am really young?

MEPH. The mirror will inform you. Go and look.

FAUST. I will, I will. (*Stops on his way to it*)
Oh, youth, youth, youth!
Youth that accomplishes instantly all desires,
Youth that each day renews itself, like day,
Youth that knows nothing of sorrow—

MEPH. (*Aside*) I should think his own words would tell him he is old; no young man ever talked so of youth.

FAUST. Now I am young, I shall break cities with my anger,
Stride like a giant amid the pygmy world,
Heap up my wealth to wondrous mountain ranges,
And be the first to climb them—at one bound;
Say to the first beggar met—You, fellow, take that golden Alp
And hire the rest of the world to cart it away.
I shall have mistresses so fierce in love
Other men will fear them as if they were tigresses,
So beauteous men will spend themselves in a moment,
Be eunuchs ever after, merely at seeing them,
Yes, for a mere glance—
Do you know, devil,
—Now I am young—I have a sudden wish
To see all women famous for great beauty?

MEPH. Helen of Troy, perhaps?

FAUST. Helen of Troy—is it possible?

MEPH. Why not? It's all set down in the old play.
There, now—look at her—look; make the usual speech
Pronounced on this occasion.
(*Points; nothing is there*)
What, must I prompt you?
—"Is this the face that launched a thousand ships?"

FAUST. "Is this—" No, no I cannot say it. Tell me first,
Here stands this delicate white-shouldered Grecian queen,
Naked and ready, yet virginal, half-ashamed,
Like Venus stripped for Mars—lusting, yet foreknowing
The shame to follow, and yet lusting—Tell me, is she real?

MEPH. (*Aside*) There's the old man again, a young one would have done it first and asked afterward.

FAUST. She is not some dream I have made up out of myself,
Such as haunts lonely men, sailor on ship,
Shepherd on starlit hilltop, the blood-wearied soldier?
She is not an illusion? I would be loath to love an illusion.

MEPH. Pitiful creature of illusion, what you see when you see
Is the sparkling pattern of the nerves in the darkling brain;
Hearing, you hear the whisperings of your ear,
Touching, you feel the tingling of your fingers.
You know of reality what the wax knows of the seal,
Its impress only, and that as wax can know it,
And do you speak of illusion? The cloudy staircase
The dreamer mounts in dream, though less than cloud,
Sustains the enchanted sleeper, and is real,
The dream sustains the dreamer, and is real,
Illusion is real while illusion lasts;
What thing outlasts its lasting?
Go, touch her.

FAUST. I will woo this rose-ivory wonder, if I am worthy her.
—My youth is real also? It is real indeed?

MEPH. You cannot mix faith and doubt; if you believe, believe; if not, why, look in the mirror; perhaps you will love yourself instead, like many a man.

FAUST. I'll look—I'll see—

(MEPHISTOPHELES *laughs*)

This laughter suddenly stops the coursing blood of my youth
Dead in the vein, like the hangman's jerk; I'll look—
I'll look—I know I am young—
(*He looks in the glass.*)
Aaagh!
Old! Old!
And Helen—Helen is gone.

MEPH. Well—she is useful only to the young,
And a woman who won't stay with you any longer than that isn't worth much. Frankly, Helen looks well, but does not wear well; she suffers the act of love like a good Christian, death; that is, patiently, and with her eyes rolled devoutly up to Heaven.

FAUST. To look on my flesh again corrupting with the loathsome tetter of old age,
To be clothed again with this cold clay like the clay of a winter grave,
To feel the blood like a slow poison seep through the narrowing artery,
To peer out through foul filmed windows upon an ever darkening world,
To be disregarded in speech as a fool or an idiot child,
To be dressed like a doll, to be spooned my food, like a babe, like a babe to be shamefully cleaned and helped to the stool,
To speak with the pipe and squeak of a eunuch, and to be as a eunuch at last,
Worst of all, to suffer in all things the dread, the terror of the old man, brittle bones descending in darkness the icy stair,
Yes, to stalk precariously on the spindly stilts of bones brittle as icicles,
Death and pain in all corners, death and pain in the bed, in the chair, in the matchstick unseen on the floor,
In the laugh, in the cough, in the sudden turning of the head, in the reaching of the hand without due deliberation,
—I would rather be the meanest, the most loathsome of living things,

The maggot in pestilent flesh, the worm that swims in pus, the fly stuck fast in a sick man's excrement,
—So it were young—than suffer this again.
No, no, I will not endure it; I will die; I will yield my humanity;
I will not be old. I will not endure to be old.

MEPH. Faustus, Faustus,
I pity you, I pity you; I meant only to help you.
I did what I could; my arts are all illusions.
But there's a magic, now, deals not in dreams
But in realities—do not deliver yourself to it.
Speak of delivering up your soul—that's nothing, only a counter in the game, swept back into the box at the end.
But do not speak of yielding up your humanity.
There is evil in the world, there are sharp ears, there are listeners who will hear you.

FAUST. Speak nothing more to me; I will not listen to you.

MEPH. Come, will you try the Future? Try and see
Whether, out of the dying animal that you are,
Some new thing may be born? Look out of what vile procession of animals
Man sprang, and stood upright; what must evolve from man?

FAUST. No more from you. Out with you: out: out!
I will call up a more powerful devil than you.

MEPH. Well, well—perhaps you will. I'll go; you continue;
This time the game will cost you. Let the play proceed;
It begins as comedy, but there will be tears enough before it finishes.

(*Exit* MEPHISTOPHELES)

FAUST. O God, I have cast both God and Devil out;
Now I am all alone.

(*Curtain falls, enter* CHORUS)

CHORUS. Out of the beast-pit, the slime, the nightmare swamps, the crawling fens,
Slowly, in violence and anguish, between terror and terror,
The mysterious ascent began: in fern-forest the creeping
Begot the stooping; the stooped beast stood erect,

The red eyes grew pure with intelligence, the clear brow
was shaped by thought,
Slowly beast-fang and beast-claw transformed to tools
and weapons, beast-spring to arrow and spear,
Beast-fear to walled towns,
The hands formed, building along with the crudities of
stone jars and skin tents a civilization
Crude and barbarous as these; eventually, then,
The great capitals, the great hives honey-packed, Athens,
Rome, Alexandria,
Byzantium, London, Paris; always in violence and
anguish
The change, the growth, but always the growth in change.

Now the stars again shift in their stations, the suns and
the moons change,
The hour of change is again upon us, it is man who
must change.
Let the violence come, let the anguish be upon us;
Only, we who are mastered beseech our masters
Never to undo the anguished toil of the ages,
Never to let man be less than man,
Never to return us to the beast-pit, the slime, the swamps,
the crawling fens.

(A knocking begins; there is disclosed a castle hall, a stair leading up to a tower, the castle door, whence the knocking comes; the door is vaguely lit by a greenish light.)

OLD SERVING-MAN. What is that knocking on the door? What is that
shuffling step upon the stair?
I know that knock, that shuffling step, I know that rustle
and stir,
The beast scratches without, the nightmare nuzzles at
the door, the Time like a hangman steps upon the
scaffold of the Place.
The other terror that passed me on the stair
Is grown mild with age, perhaps was never more than the
shadow of a fear-lit eye,
But this that comes now is worse, it is unclean, it con-
cerns man, we have created it and it concerns us,
It worsens and grows more dreadful hour by hour.

Knock, knock away! I will not open to you.
I have heard your knockings in the midnight square at Troy
Before the wooden womb gave horrible birth;
I know who lapped the blood when Caesar fell.
I have seen enough of evil in my time,
I hear you and I know you; I will not aid you.
Knock, knock away! Evil cannot come in of itself,
We must open the door to it; I shall never open to you.
I know the assassin's walk by now, I know what he bathes in.

(*Enter* YOUNG SERVING-MAN)

YOUNG S. Open—open the door, can't you hear that knocking?
Someone is there.

OLD S. Someone is there indeed; do not open.
He is grown more terrible and powerful than before.

YOUNG S. Are you mad? Do you rave? Open the door, I say.

OLD S. I am mad with my sorrow and fearful with my wisdom.
Do not open the door; I know what knocks.

YOUNG S. Are you trying to frighten me? I have fear enough; open the door.

OLD S. Fear is better than agony; do not open the door.
There is a time when all evil is weak; we must lift it over the threshold
Before it can enter and breed sorrows to a house.
Let it knock, let it knock, perhaps it will go away.

YOUNG S. You frighten me—what is it knocks outside?

OLD S. Most hideous of earth's monsters,
Face shaped from skull, body from bones built,
Head grown upon with hair like grass,
Fitted with eyes that glitter in its face,
Increases its power like a cholera, by corpses—

YOUNG S. Nonsense! I will open the door.

(*He goes to it and opens it;* OLD SERVING-MAN *stares through the open door.*)

OLD S. O agony, agony! Must I ever look upon you?

(*There is a long moment of waiting and absolute silence. Then, very slowly, there comes through the door a very queer shape. It is completely bottle-green in the faint light, and at first it is difficult to see what it is. It wears a ridiculously tall green top hat, a green muffler*

round its neck, green gloves, a green cloak, an absurdly thick, short, and clumsy green umbrella, folded, and seems to carry a number of birdcages, with some sort of small animals inside, as well as an old-fashioned doctor's case. It walks with a preposterous shuffle and sidle. It is quite small, quite frail-looking, and apparently timid. One eventually discerns that it is a little old man, very harmless-looking, with a round beaming face, mildness like a pale shine upon it. The figure wears thick square old-fashioned spectacles with gold rims, and a pair of old-fashioned rubbers which are too large. On the whole, it looks very much like a caricature of an old-fashioned doctor or professor. Some of the uncertainties about its appearance are caused by the fact that it is engaged in a clumsy and ineffective struggle to blow its nose in a large green handkerchief.)

YOUNG S. It's a man—only a man.
OLD S. So I said: a man.

(*The thing now speaks timidly, with a quavering voice that is nevertheless surprisingly strong for its body. It speaks with an imitation Oxford accent, and quite hesitantly. It is, this time, a professor.*)

DOCTOR POLIO-ANTHRAX. Pardon me—I know it is very *late.*
It was kind of you to open; very kind.
May I ask you, please—is Professor Faust at home?
YOUNG S. Yes, sir, he is—you have an appointment with him?
DOCTOR P. A. Ah, yes—an appointment—yes. A sort of appointment.
I forget for *when*—I happened to be passing by.
I know it is late—please, I am very anxious—
It is quite important—I am very eager to see him.
I have a notation somewhere—
(*He engages in a preposterous shuffling of his belongings in a vain effort to find the notation.*)
I'm afraid I've misplaced it.
I am very sorry, I am *so* sorry.
Perhaps—?
YOUNG S. What name shall I tell him?
DOCTOR P. A. Name—yes, name—wait—I will give you my card.
(*There is the same preposterous shuffling*)
I'm afraid I've forgotten it. Oh, I am so sorry.
Please tell him my name: Professor Polio-Anthrax.
YOUNG S. Professor Polio-Anthrax?
DOCTOR P. A. Yes—my name.
Please tell him Professor Polio-Anthrax to see him.
You are very kind indeed. Polio-Anthrax.

(YOUNG S. *goes out, as if to* FAUST'S *study)*

DOCTOR P. A. (*to* OLD S.) It's very late; I *hope* it isn't *too* late.
Would you take my umbrella? Umbrellas are *so* awkward.
I always take umbrellas, but they *are* so awkward.
One never quite knows—does one?—if it will rain.

(*From behind curtain the voice of the young servant is heard announcing:*)
Professor Polio-Anthrax.

DOCTOR P. A. May I come?
Thank you, thank you, you are very kind.

(*Curtain rises to show* FAUST'S *study,* POLIO-ANTHRAX *walks into it.*)

DOCTOR P. A. Professor Faust, I am Professor Polio-Anthrax.
You may perhaps have heard of me—Biology.
I know it is very late—you must excuse me.
You must excuse me—but I hope to interest you.
That is, I *hope* to interest you. Very kind.
I have brought along a number of things of interest.
May I put them on this table? Very kind.
We may call them a number of interesting experiments—
A number of very curious and interesting experiments—
Very, very curious indeed.
Of interest, I hope—yes, I am sure of interest
To such a man of science as yourself.
Would you care to see them? Very kind indeed.
Now, then, in this small—cage, I suppose one might say—
Here on my left, we have a most interesting—animal.
Indeed you will not find—I venture to say—
Anything like this animal in nature.
—Indeed I am sure you will not; I am sure indeed.
It is, I may say, a very curious—creature—
Produced in our scientific labóratories
With a very great deal of care, and a great deal of labor.
A very great deal indeed—yes, great indeed.
It is, as you may see, a sort of—mouse—
We call it (as a joke) *ridiculus mus—*
Parturient montes, nascetur ridiculus mus—

A joke, of course, a joke, the merest joke.
Nevertheless, it is really rather curious
—A *mouse,* as you see, with *feathers*—curious indeed.
Actual feathers—curious indeed.
A mouse with *feathers*—really quite amazing.
Now, then, in this *great* cage—this central cage—
We have something equally curious, if one may compare them.
And also produced at great labor—great indeed.
A creature very difficult to give a name to,
And such as you shall scarcely find in nature:
A cock, as you see—a cock with the head of a dog,
Or—shall we say—a dog—with the body of a cock?
It is indeed very difficult, difficult indeed.
Now, in this middle-sized cage—this cage I have here on my right—
Is perhaps of less interest—Oh dear oh dear!
Perhaps I shouldn't have brought it along at all.
I'm sure it's of *much* less interest. Nevertheless
Perhaps it may interest you—yes, yes, perhaps it may.
It contains what is really a very curious experiment.
It holds, as you see, a vigorous young—rat.
—Oh, I *shouldn't* put my fingers near the wires!
He's a very fierce rat, a savage fellow indeed.
Now—to tell you what is curious about this—creature—
It is, as you observe, a common rat—
Glossy and sleek, you see—and isn't he vicious!
—I found him, rather a sickly looking fellow,
—Grizzled, panting, virtually at death's door
—Oh! Beg pardon—have I said something I oughtn't?

FAUST. Grizzled? Did you say—grizzled?

DOCTOR P. A. Yes, yes, exactly—*very* old, dying of—
I say!—I *beg* your pardon—

FAUST. Old? Old?
Old, did you say? You would have said, dying of age?

DOCTOR P. A. Yes, yes, precisely; quite; dying indeed.

FAUST. Speak—quickly, quickly now—what did you do?

DOCTOR P. A. Why—simply administered—certain injections . . .

FAUST. He grew young? The rat grew young again?

DOCTOR P. A. Yes, yes, precisely: young.

FAUST. Grizzled no longer?
Sleek? Glossy? Strong?

DOCTOR P. A. As he is now,
—And so did all the others.
FAUST. All the others?
—This is not the first?
DOCTOR P. A. Oh, no, no—not the first.
Merely the only one—available.
FAUST. And all grew young?
DOCTOR P. A. All, all grew young—quite so. Yes: every one.
FAUST. You have tried this upon humans—upon men?
DOCTOR P. A. Yes—upon men.
FAUST. And it worked always?
DOCTOR P. A. Yes: it worked always.
FAUST. (*Seizing him by the throat*) Rogue, if you're lying to me,
Rocks will grow hair and pluck it out in anguish
To see what happens to you.
DOCTOR P. A. No, no—please, please—
You're choking me.
Lie—why should I lie?
FAUST. Yes—why should you?
I beg you, forgive me.
I have been much disturbed of late
By such false promises and falser enactments
—Relating all to things greatly desired—
I have grown rash in suspicion. Pardon me.

You have the formula still of these—injections?
DOCTOR P. A. Indeed I have it; yes, yes, indeed I have.
FAUST. You have it with you?
DOCTOR P. A. Have the formula with me?
Indeed, indeed; and here in this small case
I have the drug itself.
FAUST. Quickly, quickly, quickly—I must see it.
DOCTOR P. A. Here, sir, in this vial.
FAUST. Let me take it,
O let me hold it, let me look upon it.
—So simply colored? So candid? So unboastful?
Too modest, even to tinge the glass that holds it?
—I should have thought that such a sovereign substance
Would have given some inkling of its priceless powers:
Glow like a cordial, burn like Indian rubies,
Like coals of hellfire, wax and wane like planets.

This is as colorless as water or air,
And justly, perhaps, being necessary as they.
Pure medicine that saves life from the grave
And from that worse thing, the live burial of old age.
—Sir, I shall think you henceforth, not professor,
But a second, superior Nature.
—You have a syringe with you?

DOCTOR P. A. Here in my case.

FAUST. Quickly, quickly—fill it.

DOCTOR P. A. Fill it, you say?
You wish me to demonstrate the experiment?

FAUST. Yes, yes—to demonstrate the experiment.

DOCTOR P. A. Delighted, delighted.
Now—if I might ask—
I wonder if you—Could you provide a subject?

FAUST. Provide you? That I will.

DOCTOR P. A. Preferably
An old hound, say, or cat—some such animal?
—If possible, old and sickly? Of little value?

FAUST. You are as unpretentious, for your powers,
As is your medicine. Yes: I will supply you,
God knows, with the weariest worst old dog of all.

DOCTOR P. A. Thank you, thank you—you are kind indeed.
There—I am ready. And now, sir—

FAUST. Here is my arm.
Quickly; my veins thirst.

DOCTOR P. A. Sir—Oh, beg your pardon!
You are not serious.

FAUST. Serious? Serious? I?
Give me the injection.

DOCTOR P. A. Impossible—impossible!

FAUST. Impossible? Never use that word to me.
I have twice tonight set foot in Paradise
And shall I twice be thrust out? Lucifer himself
Was cast out of Heaven but once; Adam and Eve,
For getting all our woe, were only once
Expelled from Eden and felicity;
Shall I suffer more than man and devil too?
Here is my arm. Give me the injection.

DOCTOR P. A. My dear sir—why, my dear sir—let me beg you—

FAUST. The injection, I say.

DOCTOR P. A. Oh, no!
FAUST. Give me that needle,
The needle, I say!
(*They struggle; suddenly* POLIO-ANTHRAX *screams in horror.*)
DOCTOR P. A. Aaagh! You've scratched yourself!
(*A long pause*)
And there is no antidote.
FAUST. Antidote? What do you mean?
DOCTOR P. A. Oh, this is most regrettable—regrettable indeed.
If only I had not come here—most regrettable.
FAUST. Antidote?
DOCTOR P. A. No, there is no antidote—how regrettable.
FAUST. You mean—it is poison?
DOCTOR P. A. Poison? Indeed not; certainly not.
It is not a poison.
FAUST. It does not kill?
DOCTOR P. A. No, no,
It does not kill.
FAUST. It does not inflict pain?
DOCTOR P. A. Pain? No, no—not the slightest.
Tch, tch, tch—how utterly regrettable!
FAUST. Regrettable? How is it regrettable
If it brings neither death nor pain, but youth?
—I think you are mad.
DOCTOR P. A. No, no—believe me, sir—
How shall I say it?
FAUST. Speak out, you idiot—what?
Do you think I lack courage to face—do you think that I fear—
In God's name, tell me.
DOCTOR P. A. Dear me—dear oh dear!
How can one put it?
You have—so to speak—
Signed—dear, dear! a sort of dreadful contract;
Yes; one might say, a sort of dreadful contract
—Signed with your blood, one might say; yes, with your blood.
You see the drug—well, seems to exact a price
After a certain while.
I regret this, believe me.

FAUST. What price?

DOCTOR P. A. No, no, you really must excuse me. I must be going.
I will leave you this—last cage—as—well, shall we say,
A souvenir?
Thank you, thank you, you have been very kind.
Believe me, I regret all this profoundly.
Goodnight, sir, goodnight, goodnight, goodnight.
(*With surprising dexterity scoops up his other possessions and leaves study, going downstairs*)

FAUST. Youth—young as this—
(Stares at cage, transfixed; then suddenly rushes to door of study.)
Wait, wait! Come back, come back!

DOCTOR P. A. *(About to go out castle door)* Sir! You wish—?

FAUST. This beast you left here—was it not a rat?

DOCTOR P. A. *When?*

FAUST. This beast you brought tonight—was it not a rat?

DOCTOR P. A. Ah, yes, the beast I brought—yes, certainly.

FAUST. It's changed—it's changed!

DOCTOR P. A. Yes, yes, it will change further.
Regressive evolution, you might say.
Tch, tch! Regrettable.
(*To* OLD SERVING-MAN) My umbrella, please.

(*The castle door slams behind him.* FAUST *takes a drunken step back into the study; stares at the cage; and then, with a horrified cry, notices his hands. He is gazing at them with fascination as the light goes out and the curtain descends in darkness.*)

MAX BECKMANN

Otto G. von Simson

MAX BECKMANN, who died in New York recently at the age of sixty-six, was without doubt the most important German painter of his generation. It is probable that future generations will find the stamp of our age—this age of anxiety and despair—more clearly upon his work than upon that of any of his contemporaries. The connection between these two facts—Beckmann's pre-eminence as a German painter and his ability to evoke the specters of this century—seems profoundly significant. Has any nation been more deeply enmeshed in the general tragedy than Germany? And Beckmann's entire life seems to have been rocked and tossed about by that monstrous tide. In the First World War he served as a volunteer with the medical corps. His experiences during those years left him an ill and exhausted man, and by 1917 he had to be discharged. The following years, the years after the collapse of Germany, were decisive for Beckmann. It was then that his style began to take shape and mature. During the twenties, like everyone else who had the means to do so, he immersed himself briefly in the wild, loud, vulgar search for pleasure; but he never had a real part in this world that seems so unreal today. The "Self-Portrait in Dinner Jacket" of 1927 (Germanic Museum, Harvard University) shows a fierce, somber, lonely man. Friends who looked him up during those years—he was then living in Frankfurt—found him late at night "in the empty restaurant of the main station under the merciless light of electric bulbs, alone, with a bottle of champagne and a Brazil cigar. There he sat, broadshouldered, heavy, absent-minded, brooding, observing the imaginary as keenly as if it had edges."[1] He was pale, feverish, with sweat on his brow, like an exhausted hod carrier. The eclipse of German civilization under Hitler drove Beckmann into exile, first to Amsterdam, later to this country. He died just as he was about to assume a professorship at the Staedel Art School, which was at-

[1] For this and the following quotations, see B. Reifenberg and W. Hausenstein, *Max Beckmann* (Muenchen, R. Piper Verlag, 1949). In this beautifully illustrated book (82 pp., 81 plates, 8 illus. in text), Mr. Reifenberg's penetrating and sensitive appraisal deserves special notice.

Fig. 2 MAX BECKMANN: *Liberated* (1937). Coll. Mrs. L. von Schnitzler

tached to the Frankfurt museum whose collections had influenced and inspired him.

These events are recalled here not as biographical data but because they constitute the forces that shaped Beckmann's art. From the trenches of World War I he had viewed a new landscape. "The somber smokestacks of factories, a few bristling, barren poplars, and the flaming horizon. Above all this the cold stars and the empty, indifferent insane space." Beckmann determined to appropriate these things "inwardly" in order "to make them timeless afterwards."

The painter's entire work seems to be a fulfillment of this vow. Unlike George Grosz or Kaethe Kollwitz, he never became an ideological painter in the sense that his art became a means to a political end. Nor did he escape into a dream world, such as we encounter in the lovely works of Paul Klee or Marc Chagall or in abstract art—that most anemic form of artistic escapism. "I hardly need abstract forms [Beckmann said in 1938 in a lecture at the New Burlington Gallery in London] since every object is unreal enough already; so unreal that I can realize it only in painting." He was committed to the reality—or unreality—of the world around him: "As a painter, blessed or cursed, with a terrifying intensity, I am compelled to search for my wisdom with my eyes."

From this blessing or curse he did not shrink. The question, curse or blessing, which that sentence left open is answered by Beckmann's art. For one who looked at the world as he did, seeing was more often a curse than a blessing. The long series of self-portraits—no other painter except Rembrandt has painted himself so often and so pitilessly—has preserved that gaze for us: he met his world—our world—squarely, unflinchingly. These paintings, from the handsome, youthful, open face in the portrait of his wife and himself of 1909 to the self-portraits of 1944 and 1945, reveal not only the odyssey of Beckmann's life but the evolution of his style as the necessary realization of that life. Beckmann shares with many painters of his generation the awareness that for our experience and existence the artistic conventions of the nineteenth century have become meaningless. The consequences he drew from this knowledge, his decision to take his stand without compromise, made him the painter of his age. His earliest work is lost: he destroyed it himself, as if he felt that he had cut himself off completely from what he had experienced up till then, that he had to start from scratch. There still exist a number of paintings done before World War I which show the masterly ease with which he could use the style of impressionism. It was a luminous, warm, tender, sensitive world that was his then.

When that world itself was shattered, Beckmann turned his back on it forever.

The paintings he did after the war show an unbelievable change. How German they are in their somberness, defiance, squareness! To another German painter of Beckmann's generation Matisse is reported to have said, after looking at his paintings: "Vous n'êtes pas fin, mais vous avez de la force. Continuez!" The remark points up a profound distinction. So, too, the *joie de vivre,* the grace, the human warmth of a Matisse is never present in the art of Beckmann. It does not smile. His landscapes lie frozen in the "empty, indifferent, insane space" he had seen from the trenches. His interiors are not homes but traps—like the room in "Night," a picture crammed and crowded with tormentors whom the victim cannot escape. There is little tenderness of affection, little sympathy between the human figures—the dancers, harlequins, and whores—that move through Beckmann's pictures. What drives them together seems to be more often lust than love; they are lonely and cut off from one another even where they seem to converse. The coarseness of Beckmann's art is obvious and undeniable. It appears strikingly in his treatment of conventional mythological scenes. In the "Rape of Europe" (Fig. 1), he has forced the lighthearted, graceful theme into our world of suffering and brute force. One cannot look at the picture without feeling how much has been lost and how much gained: it terminates an epoch of Western art and compels us to see as we have not seen before. It is as if it were the frontispiece of our age.

It has been said that in Beckmann's work modern art appears in its complete and final phase of secularization. In a sense this statement is quite true; it grasps but the negative aspect of Beckmann's art, however. Beckmann is the painter of the human heart in its nakedness as perhaps no other painter has been—with the exception of Goya, another revolutionary in a bleak age. The men Beckmann painted, like the men he saw around him, like the man he was himself, are men thrown into a somber, icy world without grace and without hope. But Beckmann's revolt against tradition, his iconoclasm, sprang from a transcendental concern. His ultimate concern was the human soul, the "I" which he conceived as "the great veiled mystery of all existence" and as the "creator of everything," in whose "eternal, unchangeable Form" he believed. In his lecture at the New Burlington Gallery he admitted that he was absorbed in the problem of the individual, that to express and to realize this individual was the abiding goal of his art. This is the power behind the almost brutal directness, the defiant search for truth in Beckmann the artist, just

as in his moral life it is the power behind his passionate resistance to all forms of collectivism which, he said, would lower man "to the level of termites." It seems significant that Beckmann's art attains its consummation during the last twelve years of his life, when he lived as an exile from the horrors of collectivism. It is in these years that his art gains a definite simplicity and greatness of form, a decisiveness of outline, a weight and pregnancy of composition that mark that realization of freedom of which he spoke and for which he struggled. Beckmann's art seems to present one of those rare instances where one may venture to speak of an affinity of moral and artistic values. The quest for freedom has stamped his work as it did his life. The self-portrait which he called "Liberated" (Fig. 2) shows him with broken chains; it is one of his most powerful works and was painted the year he left Germany. It also seems to mark the year 1937 as a turning point in his art, a year as decisive for him as was 1642 in the life of Rembrandt.

The experience that drove Beckmann into exile is evoked in the triptych, now in the Museum of Modern Art, which he called "Scenes from Shakespeare's Tempest."[2] The center shows a scene of farewell: Prospero, who is forced to leave his country, as he is about to embark. He stands against the sea and the cloudless horizon that stretches before his eyes, a calm and regal figure, while the scenes on either side depict, in powerful contrast, acts of cruelty and horror perpetrated against men and women who are helplessly gagged and in fetters. How strange that the most dreamlike of Shakespeare's plays, the purest creation of his poetic fancy, has been chosen to mask Beckmann's own fate. Shakespeare had invented the fairy island, serenely ruled by the wise magician-prince, as the image and setting of the artist's powers and charms. For Beckmann, the island became the symbol of the free world as the only place in which the free mind can realize itself. Beckmann could not have chosen a more poignant image for that indivisibility of freedom—poetical or political—which our generation has come to experience at an appalling price of suffering.

Unlike Prospero, Beckmann did not live to return from his island of freedom. He had painted the human heart beset, though never vanquished, by demons, and his life closed when that brave and somber task was completed.

[2] Better known as "Departure."

COMTE AND HEGEL

F. A. Hayek

THE DISCUSSIONS of any age are filled with the issues on which its leading schools of thought differ. But the general intellectual atmosphere of the time is always determined by the views on which the opposing schools agree. They become the unspoken presuppositions of all thought, the common and unquestioningly accepted foundations on which all discussion proceeds.

When we no longer share these implicit assumptions of ages long past, it is comparatively easy to recognize them. But it is different with regard to the ideas underlying the thought of more recent times. Here we are frequently not yet aware of the common features which the opposing systems of thought shared, ideas which for that very reason often have crept in almost unnoticed and have achieved their dominance without serious examination. This can be very important because, as Bernard Bosanquet once pointed out, "extremes of thought may meet in error as well as in truth."[1] Such errors sometimes become dogmas merely because they were accepted by the different groups who quarreled on all the live issues, and may even continue to provide the tacit foundations of thought when most of the theories are forgotten which divided the thinkers to whom we owe that legacy.

When this is the case, the history of ideas becomes a subject of eminently practical importance. It can help us to become aware of much that governs our own thought without our explicitly knowing it. It may serve the purposes of a psychoanalytical operation by bringing to the surface unconscious elements which determine our reasoning, and perhaps assist us to purge our minds from influences which seriously mislead us on questions of our own day.

My purpose is to suggest that we are in such a position. My thesis will be that in the field of social thought not only the second half of the nineteenth century but also our own age owes much of its characteristic approach to the agreement between two thinkers who are commonly regarded as complete intellectual antipodes: the German "idealist" Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and the French "positivist" Auguste Comte. In some respects these two men do indeed

represent such complete extremes of philosophical thought that they seem to belong to different ages and scarcely even to talk about the same problems. But my concern here will be only incidentally with their philosophical systems as a whole. It will be chiefly with their influence on social theory. It is in this field that the influence of philosophical ideas can be most profound and most lasting. And there is, perhaps, no better illustration of the far-reaching effects of the most abstract ideas than the one I intend to discuss.

The suggestion that in these matters we have to deal with a common influence of Hegel and Comte has still so much the air of a paradox that I had better stress at once that I am by no means the first to notice similarities between them. I could give you a long list, and shall presently mention a few outstanding examples, of students of the history of ideas who have pointed out such resemblances. The curious fact is that these observations have again and again been made with the air of surprise and discovery, and that their authors always seem a little uneasy about their own temerity and afraid of going beyond pointing out a few isolated points of agreement. If I am not mistaken, these coincidences go much further, however, and, in their effects on the social sciences, were much more important than has yet been realized.

Before I mention some instances of such earlier notice I must, however, correct a common mistake which is largely responsible for the neglect of the whole issue. It is the belief that the similarities are due to an influence which Hegel exercised on Comte.[2] This belief is due mainly to the fact that the publication of Comte's ideas is commonly dated from the appearance of the six volumes of his *Cours de Philosophie Positive* from 1830 to 1842, while Hegel died in 1831. All the essential ideas of Comte were, however, expounded by him as early as 1822 in his youthful *System of Positive Polity;*[3] and this *opuscule fondamentale,* as he later called it, appeared also as one of the works of the Saint-Simonian group and as such probably reached a wider audience and exercised a greater influence than the *Cours* immediately did. It seems to me to be one of the most pregnant tracts of the nineteenth century, infinitely more brilliant than the now better known ponderous volumes of the *Cours.* But even the *Cours,* which is little more than an elaboration of the ideas sketched in that small tract, was planned as early as 1826 and delivered as a series of lectures before a distinguished audience in 1828.[4] Comte's main ideas were thus published within a year of Hegel's *Philosophy of Law,* within a couple of years of the *Encyklopaedie,* and of course before the post-

humous appearance of the *Philosophy of History,* to mention only Hegel's main works which are relevant here. In other words, although Comte was Hegel's junior by twenty-eight years, we must regard them to all intents and purposes as contemporaries, and there would be about as much justification for thinking that Hegel might have been influenced by Comte, as that Comte was influenced by Hegel.

You will now appreciate the significance of the first, and in many ways the most remarkable, instance in which the similarity between the two thinkers was noticed. In 1824 Comte's young pupil Gustave d'Eichthal went to study in Germany. In his letters to Comte he soon reported excitedly from Berlin about his discovery of Hegel.[5] "There is," he wrote with regard to Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of history, "a marvelous agreement between your results, even though the principles are different, at least in appearance." He went on to say that "the identity of results exists even in the practical principles, as Hegel is a defender of the governments, that is to say, an enemy of the liberals." A few weeks later d'Eichthal was able to report that he had presented a copy of Comte's tract to Hegel, who had expressed satisfaction and greatly praised the first part, although he had doubts about the meaning of the method of observation recommended in the second part. And Comte not much later even expressed the naive hope that "Hegel seemed to him in Germany the man most capable to push the positive philosophy."[6]

The later instances in which the similarity has been noticed are numerous, as I have already said. But although such widely used books as R. Flint's *Philosophy of History*[7] and J. T. Merz's *History of European Thought*[8] comment upon it, and such distinguished and diverse scholars as Alfred Fouillée,[9] Émile Meyerson,[10] Thomas Wittaker,[11] Ernst Troeltsch,[12] and Eduard Spranger[13] have discussed it—I will keep for a footnote a score of other names I could mention[14] —scarcely an attempt has yet been made at a systematic examination of these similarities, though I must not omit mention of Friedrich Dittmann's comparative study of the philosophies of history of Comte and Hegel,[15] on which I shall draw in some measure.

More significant, perhaps, than any list of the names of those who have noticed the similarities is the long series of social thinkers of the last hundred years who testify to this kinship in a different and more effective manner. Indeed, still more surprising than the neglect of the similarities in the two original doctrines is the similar failure to notice the surprising number of leading figures who succeeded in combining in their own thought ideas derived from Hegel and Comte.

Again, I can quote only a few of the names which belong here.[16] But if I tell you that the list includes Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and probably Ludwig Feuerbach in Germany, Ernest Renan, Hippolyte Taine, and Émile Durkheim in France, Giuseppe Mazzini in Italy—and I should probably add Benedetto Croce and John Dewey from the living—you will begin to see how far this influence reaches. When later I shall have occasion to show how we can trace to the same source such widespread intellectual movements as that peculiarly unhistorical approach to history which paradoxically is called historicism, much of what has been known as sociology during the last hundred years, and especially its most fashionable and most ambitious branch, the sociology of knowledge, you will perhaps understand the importance which I attach to this combined influence.

Before addressing myself to my main task, I must go through one more preliminary: I ought, in fairness, to acquaint you with a serious deficiency with which I approach it. So far as Comte is concerned, it is true that I strongly disagree with most of his views. But this disagreement is still of a kind which leaves room for profitable discussion because there exists at least some common basis. If it is true that criticism is worth-while only when one approaches one's object with at least this degree of sympathy, I am afraid I cannot claim this qualification with regard to Hegel. Concerning him I have always felt, not only what his greatest British admirer said, that his philosophy was "a scrutiny of thought so profound that it was for the most part unintelligible,"[17] but also what John Stuart Mill experienced who "found by actual experience . . . that conversancy with him tends to deprave one's intellect."[18] I ought to warn you, therefore, that I do not pretend to understand Hegel. But, fortunately for my task, a comprehension of his system as a whole is not necessary. I think I know well enough those parts of his doctrines which have, or are supposed to have, influenced the development of the social sciences. Indeed, they are so well known that my task will consist largely in showing that many of the developments commonly ascribed to Hegel's influence might well in fact be due to Comte's. It seems to me that it is largely the support which the Hegelian tradition received from this quarter that accounts for the otherwise inexplicable fact that in the social sciences Hegelian thought and language continued to rule for so long after, in the other fields of science, the rule of his philosophy had long been superseded by that of exact science.

There is one feature, however, which their general theories of knowledge have in common, and which I must mention—for its own

sake as well as because it will give me an opportunity to refer to an interesting question which I shall not have time to consider elsewhere in this paper: the original source of their common ideas.

The point of their doctrines to which I refer is one on which at first they may appear to hold diametrically opposed views: their attitude to empirical research. For Comte this constitutes the whole of science; for Hegel it is entirely outside what he calls science, although he by no means underrates the importance of factual knowledge within its sphere. What brings them together is their belief that empirical science must be purely descriptive, confined to establishing regularities of the observed phenomena. They are both strict phenomenalists in this sense, denying that empirical science can proceed from description to explanation. That the positivist Comte regards all explanation, all discussion of the manner in which the phenomena are produced, as futile metaphysics, while Hegel reserves it to his idealistic philosophy of nature, is a different matter. In their views on the functions of empirical research they agree almost completely, as Émile Meyerson has beautifully shown.[19] When Hegel argues, for example, that "empirical science has no business to assert the existence of anything that is not given to sense perception,"[20] he is as much a positivist as Comte.

Now this phenomenalist approach to the problems of empirical science derives in modern times without question from Descartes, to whom both philosophers are directly indebted. And the same is, I believe, true of the second basic feature which they have in common and which will show up strongly in the more detailed points on which they agree: their common rationalism, or better, intellectualism. It was Descartes who first combined these apparently incompatible ideas of a phenomenalist or sensualist approach to physical science and a rationalist view of man's task and functions.[21] With respect to the points in which we are chiefly interested, it was mainly through Montesquieu,[22] d'Alembert,[23] Turgot, and Condorcet in France, Herder,[24] Kant, and Fichte in Germany, that the Cartesian heritage was passed on to Hegel and Comte. But what in those men had been merely bold and stimulating suggestions became with our two philosophers the bases of the two ruling systems of thought of their time. In thus stressing the common Cartesian origin of what I believe to be the common errors of Hegel and Comte, I wish, of course, not in the least to deprecate the great services which Descartes has rendered to modern thought. But as has been true with so many fertile ideas, a stage is often reached when their very success brings about their application to fields in which they are no longer appropriate. And

this is what, I believe, Comte and Hegel have done.

When we turn to the field of social theory we find that the central ideas which Hegel and Comte have in common are so closely related that we can almost express them all in one sentence, if we give due weight to every single word. Such a statement would have to run somewhat like this: the central aim of all study of society must be to construct a universal history of all mankind, understood as a scheme of the necessary development of humanity according to recognizable laws. It is characteristic of the extent to which their ideas have entered into the whole intellectual make-up of our time that, thus baldly stated, they now sound almost commonplace. Only when we analyze in greater detail the meaning and the implications of this statement do we become aware of the extraordinary nature of the undertaking which it proposes.

The laws which both seek—and it makes little difference that Comte presents them as "natural laws"[25] while for Hegel they are metaphysical principles—are in the first instances laws of the development of the human mind. They both claim, in other words, that our individual minds, which contribute to this process of development, are at the same time capable of comprehending it as a whole. It is the necessary succession of stages of the human mind determined by these dynamic laws which accounts for a corresponding succession of different civilizations, cultures, *Volksgeister,* or social systems.

Their common stress on the predominance of the intellectual development in this process, incidentally, in no way conflicts with the fact that the most influential tradition which they both inspired came misleadingly to be called the "materialist" interpretation of history. Comte, in this as in many other points nearer to Marx than Hegel, laid the foundation for this development with his stress on the predominant importance of our knowledge of nature; and the basic contention of the so-called materialist (or better, technological) interpretation of history is, after all, merely that it is our knowledge of nature and of technological possibilities which governs the development in other fields. The essential point, the belief that one's own mind should be capable of explaining itself, and the laws of its past and future development—I cannot explain here why to me this seems to involve a contradiction[26]—is the same with both, and it is derived by Marx, and through him by his disciples, from Hegel and Comte.

The conception of laws of succession of distinct stages in the development of the human mind in general, and in all its particular manifestations and concretizations, of course implies that these wholes or

collectives can be directly apprehended as individuals of a species: that we can directly perceive civilizations or social systems as objectively given facts. Such a claim is not surprising in a system of idealism like Hegel's, that is, as a product of a conceptual realism or of "essentialism."[27] But it seems at first out of place in a naturalist system like Comte's. The fact is, however, that his phenomenalism which eschews all mental constructions and allows him to admit only of what can be directly observed, forces him into a position very similar to Hegel's. Since he cannot deny the existence of social structures, he must claim that they are immediately given to experience. In fact, he goes so far as to claim that the social wholes are undoubtedly better known and more directly observable than the elements of which they consist,[28] and that therefore social theory must start from our knowledge of the directly apprehended wholes.[29] Thus he, no less than Hegel, starts from intuitively apprehended abstract concepts of society or civilization, and then deductively derives from it his knowledge of the structure of the object. He even goes so far, surprisingly enough in a positivist, as to claim explicitly that from this conception of the total we can derive a priori knowledge about the necessary relations of the parts.[30] It is this which justifies it if Comte's positivism has sometimes been described as a system of idealism.[31] Like Hegel he treats as "concrete universals"[32] those social structures which in fact we come to know only by composing them, or building them up, from the familiar elements; and he even surpasses Hegel in claiming that only society as a whole is real and that the individual is only an abstraction.[33]

The similarity of the treatment of social evolution by Hegel and Comte goes far beyond these methodological aspects. For both, society appears as an organism in a fairly literal sense. Both compare the stages through which social evolution must pass with the different ages through which individual man passes in his natural growth. And for both, the growth of the conscious control of his destiny by man is the main content of history.

Neither Comte nor Hegel was of course a historian, properly speaking—although it is not so very long since it was the fashion to describe them, in contrast to their predecessors, as "true historians"[34] because they were "scientific," which, presumably, meant that they aimed at the discovery of laws. But what they presented as the "historical method" soon began to displace the approach of the great historical school of a Niebuhr or a Ranke. It is customary to trace to Hegel the rise of the later historicism[35] with its belief in the necessary succession of "stages" which manifest themselves in all fields of social

life; but Comte's influence had probably more to do with it than Hegel's.

In the confused state of terminology on these matters,[36] it is perhaps necessary to say explicitly that I draw a sharp distinction between the "historical school" of the early nineteenth century and the majority of the later professional historians, and the historicism of a Marx, a Schmoller, or a Sombart. It was the latter who believed that with the discovery of laws of development they had the only key to true historical understanding, and who in an altogether unjustified arrogance claimed that the earlier writers, and particularly those of the eighteenth century, had been "unhistorical." It seems to me that in many respects David Hume, for example, had much more justification when he believed his "to be the historical age and [his] to be the historical nation"[37] than the historicists who tried to turn history into a theoretical science. The abuses to which this historicism ultimately led is best seen by the fact that even a thinker so close to it as Max Weber was once driven to describe the whole *Entwicklungsgedanke* as a "romantic swindle."[38] I have little to add to the masterly analysis of this historicism by my friend Karl Popper, hidden away in a wartime volume of *Economica*,[39] except that the responsibility for it seems to me to rest at least as much with Comte and positivism as with Plato and Hegel.

This historicism, let me repeat, was much less an affair of the historians proper than of the representatives of the other social sciences who applied what they believed to be the "historical method." Gustav Schmoller, the founder of the younger historical school in economics, is perhaps the best example of one who was clearly guided by the philosophy of Comte rather than that of Hegel.[40] But if the influence of this kind of historicism was perhaps most marked in economics, it was a fashion which, first in Germany and then elsewhere, affected all the social sciences. It could be shown to have influenced the history of art[41] no less than anthropology or philology. And the great popularity which "philosophies of history" have enjoyed during the last hundred years, theories which ascribed to the historical process an intelligible "meaning" and which pretended to show us a recognizable destiny of mankind, is essentially the result of this joint influence of Hegel and Comte.

I will not dwell here on another and perhaps only superficial resemblance between their theories: the fact that with Comte the necessary development proceeds according to the famous law of the three stages, while with Hegel a similar threefold rhythm is the result of the

growth of mind as a dialectical process which proceeds from thesis to antithesis and synthesis. More important is the fact that for both men history leads to a predetermined end, that it can be interpreted teleologically as a succession of achieved purposes.

Their historical determinism—by which is meant, not merely that historical events are somehow determined, but that *we* are able to recognize why they were bound to take a particular course—necessarily implies a thorough fatalism: man cannot change the course of history. Even the outstanding individuals are, with Comte, merely "instruments"[42] or "organs of a predestined movement,"[43] or with Hegel *Geschäftsführer des Weltgeistes,* managers of the World Spirit whom Reason cunningly uses for its own purposes.

There is no room for freedom in such a system: for Comte freedom is "the rational submission to the domination of natural laws,"[44] that is, of course, his natural laws of inevitable development; for Hegel it is the recognition of necessity.[45] And since both are in possession of the secret of the "definitive and permanent intellectual unity"[46] to which evolution is tending according to Comte, or of the "absolute truth" in Hegel's sense, they both claim for themselves the right to impose a new orthodoxy. But I have to admit that in this as in many other respects the much abused Hegel is still infinitely more liberal than the "scientific" Comte. There are in Hegel no such fulminations against the unlimited liberty of conscience as we find throughout the work of Comte, and Hegel's attempt to use the machinery of the Prussian state to impose an official doctrine[47] appears very tame compared with Comte's plan for a new "religion of humanity" and all his other thoroughly antiliberal schemes for regimentation which even his old admirer John Stuart Mill ultimately branded as "liberticide."[48]

I have not the time to show in any detail how these similar political attitudes are reflected in equally similar evaluations of different historical periods or of different institutions. I will merely mention, as particularly characteristic, that the two thinkers show the same dislike of Periclean Greece and of the Renaissance, and the same admiration for Frederick the Great.[49]

The last major point of agreement between Hegel and Comte which I will mention is no more than a consequence of their historicism. But it has exercised so much independent influence that I must discuss it separately. It is their thorough moral relativism, their conviction either that all moral rules can be recognized as justified by the circumstances of the time, or that only those are valid which can be thus explicitly justified—it is not always clear which they mean. This

idea is, of course, merely an application of historical determinism, of the belief that we can adequately explain why people at different times believed what they actually did believe. This pretended insight into the manner in which people's thought is determined implies the claim that we can know what they ought to believe in given circumstances, and the dismissal as irrational or inappropriate of all moral rules which cannot be thus justified.

In this connection historicism shows most clearly its rationalist or intellectualist character:[50] Since the determination of all historical development is to be intelligible, only such forces as can be fully understood by us can have been at work. Comte's attitude on this is really not very different from Hegel's statement that all that is real is rational and all that is rational is also real[51]—only that instead of rational Comte would have said historically necessary and therefore justified. Everything appears to him as in this sense justified in its time, slavery and cruelty, superstition and intolerance, because—this he does not say but it is implied in his reasoning—there are no moral rules which we must accept as transcending our individual reason, nothing which is a given and unconscious presupposition of all our thought, and by which we must judge moral issues. Indeed, he significantly could not conceive of any other possibility except either a system of morals designed and revealed by a higher being, or one demonstrated by our own reason.[52] And between these two the necessary superiority of the "demonstrated morals" seemed to him unquestionable. Comte was both more consistent and more extreme than Hegel. He had indeed already stated the main conception in his very first publication when, at the age of nineteen, he wrote: "There is nothing good and nothing bad, absolutely speaking; everything is relative, this is the only absolute statement."[53]

It is possible, however, that with regard to this particular point I am attributing too much importance to the influence of our two philosophers and that they were merely following a general fashion of their time which fitted in with their systems of thought. How rapidly moral relativism was then spreading we can see clearly in an interesting exchange of letters between Thomas Carlyle and John Stuart Mill. As early as January 1833 we find Carlyle writing to Mill with reference to a recently published *History of the French Revolution*:[54] "Has not this man Thiers a wonderful system of Ethics *in petto?* He will prove to you that the power to have done a thing almost (if not altogether) gave you the right to do it: every hero of his turns out to be perfectly justified—he has succeeded in doing."[55] To which Mill replied: "You have characterized Thiers' system of

ethics most accurately. I am afraid it is too just a specimen of the young French *Litterateurs,* and that this is *all* they have made, ethically speaking, of their attempts to imitate the Germans in identifying themselves with the *past.* By dint of shifting their point of view to make it accord with that of whomever they are affecting to judge, coupled with their historical fatalism, they have arrived at the annihilation of all moral distinctions except *success* and *not success.*"[56] It is interesting that Mill, who knew very well how these ideas had been spread in France by the Saint-Simonians, yet explicitly ascribes their appearance in a young French historian to German influence.

That these views lead both Comte and Hegel to a complete moral and legal positivism[57]—and at times desperately close to the doctrine that Might is Right—I can mention only in passing. I believe that quite a good case could be made out that they are among the main sources of the modern tradition of legal positivism. It is, after all, only another manifestation of the same general attitude that refuses to admit anything as relevant which cannot be recognized as the expression of conscious reason.

This brings me back to the common central idea which underlies all these particular similarities of the doctrines of Comte and Hegel: the idea that we can improve upon the results of the earlier individualist approaches with their modest endeavor to understand how individual minds interact, by studying Human Reason, with a capital R, from the outside as it were, as something objectively given and observable as a whole, as it might appear to some supermind. From the belief that they had achieved the old ambition of *se ipsam cognoscere mentem,* and that they had reached a position where they were able to predict the future course of the growth of Reason, it was only one step more to the still more presumptuous idea that Reason should now be able to pull itself up by its own bootstraps to its definitive or absolute state. It is in the last analysis this intellectual *hubris,* the seeds of which were sown by Descartes, and perhaps already by Plato, which is the common trait in Hegel and Comte. The concern with the movement of Reason as a whole not only prevented them from understanding the process through which the interaction of individuals produced structures of relationships which performed actions no individual reason could fully comprehend, but it also made them blind to the fact that the attempt of conscious reason to control its own development could only have the effect of limiting this very growth to what the individual directing mind could

foresee.[58] Although this aspiration is a direct product of a certain brand of rationalism, it seems to me to be the result of a misunderstood rationalism, which I prefer to call intellectualism—a rationalism which fails in its most important task, namely, in recognizing the limits of what individual conscious reason can accomplish.

Hegel and Comte both singularly fail to make intelligible how the interaction of the efforts of individuals can create something greater than they know. While Adam Smith and the other great Scottish individualists of the eighteenth century—even though they spoke of the "invisible hand"—provided such an explanation,[59] all that Hegel and Comte give us is a mysterious teleological force. And while eighteenth-century individualism, essentially humble in its aspirations, aimed at understanding as well as possible the principles by which the individual efforts combined to produce a civilization in order to learn what were the conditions most favorable to its further growth, Hegel and Comte became the main source of that hubris of collectivism which aims at "conscious direction" of all forces of society.

I must now attempt to illustrate briefly, by a few more examples, the hints I have already given about the course which the common influence of Hegel and Comte took. One of the most interesting to study in detail would be that once very famous but now largely forgotten German philosopher, Ludwig Feuerbach. It would be even more significant if that old Hegelian, who became the founder of German positivism, had arrived at that position without any knowledge of Comte; but circumstances make it very probable that he too had at an early stage become acquainted with Comte's first *Système*.[60] How enormous his influence was, not only on the other radical Young Hegelians but on the whole rising generation, is best seen in the account given by Friedrich Engels, who describes how they "all became at once Feuerbachians."[61]

The blend of Hegelianism and positivism which Feuerbach provided[62] became characteristic of the thought of the whole group of German social theorists who appeared in the 1840's. Only one year after Feuerbach had broken away from Hegel because, as he later said, he had recognized that the absolute truth meant merely the absolute professor,[63] the same year in which the last volume of Comte's *Cours* appeared and when, incidentally, the young Karl Marx sent his first work to the printers, namely, in 1842, another author, who was very influential and representative of the time,

Lorenz von Stein, published his *Socialism and Communism in France,* which admittedly attempted a fusion of Hegelian and Saint-Simonian and therefore Comtian thought.[64] It has often been noticed that in this work Stein anticipated much of the historical theories of Karl Marx.[65] This fact becomes even more suggestive when we find that another man who was later discovered as a precursor of Karl Marx, the Frenchman Jules Lechevalier, was an old Saint-Simonian who had actually studied under Hegel in Berlin.[66] He preceded Stein by ten years, but remained for some time an isolated figure in France. But in Germany Hegelian positivism, if I may so call it, became the dominant trend of thought. It was in this atmosphere that both Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels formed their now famous theories of history, largely Hegelian in language but, I believe, much more indebted to Saint-Simon and Comte than is commonly realized.[67] And it was those similarities which I have discussed which made it so easy for them to retain Hegelian language for the exposition of a theory which, as Marx himself said, in some respects turned Hegel upside down.

It is probably also more than an accident that it was almost at the same time, in 1841 and in 1843, that two men who were much nearer to a natural science approach to social study than they were to Hegel, Friedrich List[68] and Wilhelm Roscher,[69] began the tradition of historicism in economics which became the model that the other social sciences soon eagerly followed. It was in those fifteen or twenty years following 1842[70] that the ideas developed and spread which gave Germany for the first time a leading position in the social sciences; and it was to some extent by way of re-export from Germany (though partly also from England through Mill and Buckle), that French historians and sociologists such as Taine[71] and Durkheim[72] became familiar with the positivist tradition at the same time as with Hegelianism.

It was under the banner of this historicism made in Germany that in the second half of the nineteenth century the great attack on individualist social theory was conducted, that the very foundations of individualist and liberal society came to be questioned, and that both historical fatalism and ethical relativism became dominant traditions. And it was particularly under its influence that, from Marx to Sombart and Spengler, "philosophies of history" became the most influential expression of the attitude of the age to social problems.[73] Its most characteristic expression, however, is probably the so-called sociology of knowledge which to the present day in its two distinct

yet closely similar branches still shows how the two strands of thought originating from Comte and Hegel operate sometimes side by side and sometimes in combination.[74] And, last but not least, most of modern socialism derives its theoretical foundation from that *Alliance intellectuelle franco-allemande,* as Celestin Bouglé has called it,[75] which was in the main an alliance of German Hegelianism and French positivism.

Let me conclude this historical sketch by one more remark. After 1859, as far as the social sciences are concerned, the influence of Darwin could do little more than confirm an already existing tendency. Darwinism may have assisted the introduction into the Anglo-Saxon world of ready-fashioned evolutionary theories. But if we examine such scientific "revolutions" as were attempted in the social sciences under the influence of Darwin, for example, by Thorstein Veblen and his disciples, they appear in fact as little more than a revival of the ideas which German historicism had developed under the influence of Hegel and Comte. I suspect, though I have no proof, that on closer investigation even this American branch of historicism would prove to have more direct connections with the original source of these ideas.[76]

It is impossible in this brief paper to do full justice to so big a subject. Least of all can I hope, with the few remarks I have been able to make on the filiation of ideas, to have convinced you that they are correct in every detail. But I trust I have at least provided sufficient evidence to persuade you of the burden of my argument: that we are still, largely without knowing it, under the influence of ideas which have almost imperceptibly crept into modern thought because they were shared by the founders of what seemed to be radically opposed traditions. In these matters we are to a great extent still guided by ideas which are at least a century old, just as the nineteenth century was mainly guided by the ideas of the eighteenth. But while the ideas of Hume and Voltaire, of Adam Smith and Kant, produced the liberalism of the nineteenth century, those of Hegel and Comte, of Feuerbach and Marx, have produced the totalitarianism of the twentieth.

It may well be true that we as scholars tend to overestimate the influence which we can exercise on contemporary affairs. But I doubt whether it is possible to overestimate the influence which ideas have in the long run. And there can be no question that it is our special duty to recognize the currents of thought which still operate in public

opinion, to examine their significance, and, if necessary, to refute them. It was an attempt to fulfill at least the first part of this duty which I have tried to outline in this paper.

NOTES

1. Bernard Bosanquet, *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy* (London, 1921), p. 100.

2. See Hutchinson Stirling, "Why the Philosophy of History Ends with Hegel and Not with Comte," in "Supplementary Note" to A. Schwegler's *Handbook of the History of Philosophy*, and John Tulloch, *Edinburgh Review*, CCLX (1868). E. Troeltsch, *Der Historismus und seine Probleme (Gesammelte Schriften III)* (Tübingen, 1922), p. 24, is inclined to ascribe even Comte's celebrated law of the three stages to the influence of Hegel's dialectics, although it derives in fact from Turgot. Cf. also R. Levin, *Der Geschichtsbegriff des Positivismus* (Leipzig, 1935), p. 20.

3. First published in 1822 in H. de Saint-Simon's *Catéchisme des Industrielles* as *Plan for the Scientific Operations Necessary for Reorganizing Society* and two years later republished separately as *System of Positive Polity*—"a title premature indeed, but rightly indicating the scope" of his labors, as Comte wrote much later when he reprinted his early works as an Appendix to his *Système de politique positive*. A translation of this appendix by D. H. Hutton was published in 1911 under the title *Early Essays in Social Philosophy* in Routledge's "New Universal Library," and it is from this little volume that the above English titles and the later quotations are taken.

4. On Comte's early history and his relation to Saint-Simon see the comprehensive account in H. Gouhier, *La jeunesse d'Auguste Comte et la Formation du Positivisme* (3 vols.; Paris, 1933–40).

5. Gustave d'Eichthal to Auguste Comte, November 18, 1824, and January 12, 1825. P. Lafitte, "Matériaux pour servir à la Biographie d'Auguste Comte: Correspondance, d'Auguste Comte avec Gustave d'Eichthal," *La Revue Occidentale*, second series, XII (19 année [1891]), Part II, 186 ff.

6. *Lettres d'Auguste Comte à Divers*, (Paris, 1905,) II, 86 (April 11, 1825).

7. R. Flint, *Philosophy of History in Europe*, I (1874), 262, 267, 281.

8. J. T. Merz, *History of European Thought*, IV (1914), 186, 481 ff., 501–3.

9. A. Fouillée, *Le mouvement positiviste* (1896), pp. 268, 366.

10. E. Meyerson, *L'explication dans les sciences* (1921), II, 122–38.

11. T. Wittaker, *Reason: A Philosophical Essay with Historical Illustrations* (Cambridge, 1934), pp. 7–9.

12. Troeltsch, *op. cit.*, p. 408.

13. E. Spranger, "Die Kulturzyklentheorie und das Problem des Kulturverfalles," *Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*. Philosophisch-Historische Klasse, 1926, pp. xlii ff.

14. W. Ashley, *Introduction to English Economic History and Theory* (3d ed.; 1914), I, ix–xi. A. W. Benn, *History of British Rationalism* (1906), I, 412, 449; II, 82. E. Caird, *The Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte* (2d ed.; 1893), p. 51. M. R. Cohen, "Causation and its Application to History," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, III (1942), 12. R. Eucken, "Zur Würdigung Comte's und des Posivitismus," in *Philosophische Aufsätz Eduard Zeller gewidmet* (Leipzig, 1887), p. 67, and also in *Geistige Strömungen der Gegenwart* (1904), p. 164. K. R. Geijer, "Hegelianism och Positivism," *Lunds Universitets Arsskrift*, XVIII (1883). G. Gourvitch, *L'idée du droit social* (1932), pp. 271, 297. H. Hoeffding, *Der menschliche Gedanke* (1911), p. 41. M. Mandelbaum, *The Problem of Historical Knowledge* (New York, 1938), pp. 312 ff. G. Mehlis, "Die Geschichtsphilosophie Hegels und Comtes," *Jahrbuch für Soziologie*, III (1927). J. Rambaud, *His-*

toire des Doctrines Economiques (1899), pp. 485, 542. E. Rothacker, *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* (1920), pp. 190, 287. A. Salomon, "Tocqueville's Philosophy of Freedom," *Review of Politics,* I (1939), 400. M. Schinz, *Geschichte der französischen Philosophie* (1914), I, 2. W. Windelband, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie* (new ed.; 1935), pp. 554 f. An article by G. Salomon-Delatour, "Hegel ou Comte," in the *Revue Positiviste Internationale,* LII (1935), and LIII (1936), became available to me only after the present essay was in the hands of the printer.

15. F. Dittmann, "Die Geschichtsphilosophie Comtes und Hegels," *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie,* XXXVIII (1914), XXXIX (1915).

16. The list of additional names, which could be extended almost indefinitely, would include, among others, such ones as Eugen Dühring, Arnold Ruge, J. P. Proudhon, V. Pareto, L. T. Hobhouse, E. Troeltsch, W. Dilthey, Karl Lamprecht, and Kurt Breysig. A rather special case in which, if not distinctly Comtian and Hegelian, at least French positivist and German idealist thought blended was that of Thomas Carlyle. As early as 1822–24 he had translated Legendre's *Geometry* and later got so interested in the Saint-Simonian movement that he attempted to publish a translation of Saint-Simon's *Nouveau Christianisme* with an unsigned introduction. After that, he found no difficulty in reconciling these interests with a conversion to German idealism. See Hill Shine, *Carlyle and the Saint-Simonians. The Concept of Historical Periodicity* (Baltimore, 1941).

17. Quoted by K. R. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (London, 1945), II, 25.

18. J. S. Mill to A. Bain, November 4, 1867, *The Letters of John Stuart Mill,* ed. H. S. R. Elliot (London, 1910), II, 93.

19. Meyerson, *op. cit.,* esp. chap. xiii.

20. Meyerson, *op. cit.,* II, 50.

21. J. Laporte, *Le Rationalisme de Descartes* (new ed.; Paris, 1950).

22. E. Buss, "Montesquieu und Cartesius," *Philosophische Monatshefte,* IV (1869), 1–37, and H. Trescher, "Montesquieu's Einfluss auf die philosophischen Grundlagen der Staatslehre Hegels," *Schmollers Jahrbuch,* XLII (1918).

23. Cf. Schinz, *op. cit.,* and G. Misch, "Zur Entstehung des französischen Positivismus," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie,* XIV (1901).

24. In a letter of August 5, 1824, Comte writes of Herder as "prédécesseur du Condorcet, mon prédécesseur immediat." See *Lettres d'Auguste Comte à Divers* (Paris, 1905), II, 56.

25. Comte, *Cours de Philosophie Positive* (5th ed. [identical with the 1st]; Paris, 1893), IV, 253; see also *Early Essays,* p. 150.

26. For a systematic analysis and criticism of these ideas see my essay, "Scientism and the Study of Society," *Economica* (N.S.), Vols. IX–XI (1942–44).

27. Cf. K. R. Popper, "The Poverty of Historicism," *Economica* (N.S.), XI (1944), 94.

28. *Cours,* IV, 286: "l'ensemble du sujet est certainement alors beaucoup mieux connu et plus immédiatement abordable que les diverses parties qu'on distinguera ultérieurement."

29. *Cours,* IV, 291.

30. *Cours,* IV, 526.

31. See, for example, E. de Roberty, *Philosophie du siècle* (Paris, 1891), p. 29, and Schinz, *op. cit.,* p. 255.

32. Salomon, *op. cit.,* p. 400.

33. *Cours,* VI, 590; *Discours sur l'esprit positive* (1918 ed.), p. 118.

34. Cf., for example, Dittmann, *op. cit.,* XXXVIII, 310, and Merz, *op. cit.,* p. 500.

35. Cf. Popper, *Open Society,* and Karl Löwith, *Von Hegel zu Nietzsche* (Zürich, 1941), p. 302.

36. This long-standing confusion has been accentuated recently by the fact that so distinguished a historian as Friedrich Meinecke devoted his great work, *Die Entstehung des Historismus* (München, 1936), entirely to that earlier historical school, in contradistinction to which the term *historicism* was coined during the second half of the nine-

teenth century. See also W. Eucken, "Die Ueberwindung des Historismus," *Schmollers Jahrbuch*, LXIII (1938).

37. Quoted by G. Bryson, *Man and Society* (Princeton, 1945), p. 78.

38. Quoted by Troeltsch, *op. cit.*, pp. 189–90, note.

39. Popper, "The Poverty of Historicism," as quoted above.

40. On Comte's influence on the growth of the younger historical school in German economics compare particularly F. Raab, *Die Fortschrittsidee bei Gustav Schmoller* (Freiburg, 1934), p. 72, and H. Waentig, *August Comte und Seine Bedeutung für die Entwicklung der Sozialwissenschaft* (Leipzig, 1894).

41. Most clearly seen in the person of Wilhelm Scherer. See also Rothacker, *op. cit.*, pp. 190–250.

42. *Early Essays*, p. 15.

43. *Cours*, IV, 298.

44. *Cours*, IV, 157: "Car la vraie liberté ne peut consister, sans doute, qu'en une soumission rationelle a la seule prépondérance, convenablement constatée, des lois fondamentales de la nature."

45. *Philosophie der Geschichte*, ed. Reclam, p. 77: "Notwendig ist das Vernünftige als das Substantielle, und frei sind wir, indem wir es als Gesetz anerkennen und ihm als Substanz unseres eigenen Wesens folgen: der objektive und der subjektive Wille sind dann ausgesöhnt und ein und dasselbe ungetrübte Ganze."

46. *Cours*, IV, 144; cf. *Early Essays*, p. 132.

47. For references see Meyerson, *L'explication*, II, 130, and cf. Popper, *Open Society*, II, 40.

48. J. S. Mill to Harriet Mill, Rome, January 15, 1855: "Almost all the projects of social reformers of these days are really *liberticide*—Comte's particularly so" (unpublished letter, Yale University Library). For a fuller statement of Comte's political conclusions, whose antiliberal tendencies go far beyond anything Hegel ever said, see my "Counter-revolution of Science," *Economica*, VIII, 315 f.

49. In Comte's "Positivist Calendar" the "Month of Modern Statesmanship" is given the name of Frederick the Great!

50. Cf. H. Preller, "Rationalismus und Historismus," *Historische Zeitschrift*, CXXVI (1922).

51. *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Preface ("Philosophische Bibliothek" [Leipzig, Felix Meiner, 1911]), p. 14.

52. *Système de Politique Positive* (1854), I, 356: "La supériorité nécessaire de la moral démontrée sur la morale revelée."

53. *L'industrie*, ed. H. de Saint-Simon, Vol. III, 2^{me} cahier.

54. A. Thiers, *Histoire de la révolution française* (1823–27).

55. T. Carlyle to J. S. Mill, January 12, 1833, in *Letters of Thomas Carlyle to John Stuart Mill, John Sterling and Robert Browning*, ed. Alexander Carlyle (London, 1910).

56. J. S. Mill to T. Carlyle, February 2, 1833 (unpublished letter in the National Library of Scotland).

57. On Hegel's legal positivism see particularly H. Heller, *Hegel und der nationale Machstaatsgedanke in Deutschland* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1921), p. 166, and Popper, *The Open Society*, II, 39. For Comte see *Cours*, IV, 266 ff.

58. Cf. my article on "Scientism, etc.," *Economica*, XI, 31 ff.

59. Cf. my *Individualism and Economic Order* (Chicago, 1948), p. 7.

60. Cf. my "Counter-revolution of Science," p. 288.

61. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy* (New York, 1941), p. 18.

62. On Feuerbach see S. Rawidowicz, *Ludwig Feuerbachs Philosophie* (Berlin, 1931); K. Löwith, *Von Hegel bis Nietzsche* (Zürich, 1941); A. Lévy, *La philosophie du Feuerbach* (Paris, 1904), and F. Lombardi, *L. Feuerbach* (Florence, 1935). A recent English study of Feuerbach by W. B. Chamberlain, *Heaven Wasn't His Destination* (London, 1941), is unfortunately quite inadequate. For the widespread positivistic tendencies among the

Young Hegelians see particularly D. Koigen, *Zur Vorgeschichte des modernen philosophischen Sozialismus in Deutschland* (Bern, 1901).

63. L. Feuerbach to W. Bolin, Oct. 20, 1860, *Ausgewählte Briefe von und an Feuerbach*, ed. W. Bolin (Leipzig, 1904), II, 246–47.

64. Lorenz Stein, *Der Socialismus und Communismus im heutigen Frankreich* (Leipzig, 1842).

65. See Heinz Nitschke, "Die Geschichtsphilosophie Lorenz von Steins," *Historische Zeitschrift*, Supplement XXVI, 1932, especially p. 136 for the earlier literature on the subject; and T. G. Masaryk, *Die philosophischen und soziologischen Grundlagen des Marxismus* (Vienna, 1899), p. 34.

66. On Jules Lechevalier see H. Ahrens, *Naturrecht* (6th ed.; Vienna, 1870), I, 204; Charles Pelarin, *Notice sur Jules Lechevalier et Abel Transon* (Paris, 1877); A. V. Wenckstern, *Marx* (Leipzig, 1896), pp. 205 f.; and S. Bauer, "Henri de Saint-Simon nach hundert Jahren," *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus*, XII (1926), 172.

67. A careful analysis of the positivist influence on Marx and Engels would require a separate investigation. A direct influence extending to surprising verbal similarities could be shown in the writing of Engels, while the influence on Marx is probably more indirect. Some material for such a study will be found in T. G. Masaryk, *op. cit.*, p. 35, and Lucie Prenant, "Marx et Comte," in *A la Lumière de Marxisme* (Paris, Cercle de la Russie Neuve, 1937), Vol. II, Part I. In a late letter to Engels (July 7, 1866), Marx who was then reading Comte, apparently for the first time consciously (as distinguished from his probable acquaintance with Comte's Saint-Simonian writing) describes him as "lamentable" compared to Hegel.

68. Friedrich List, *Nationales System der politischen Oekonomie* (1841).

69. Wilhelm Roscher, *Grundriss zu Vorlesungen über die Staatswirtschaft nach historischer Methode* (1843).

70. The special significance of the year 1842 in this connection is well brought out by D. Koigen, *op. cit.*, pp. 236 ff., and by Hans Freund, *Soziologie und Sozialismus* (Würzburg, 1934). Particularly instructive on the influence of positivism on the German historians of the period are the letters of J. G. Droysen. See particularly his letter of February 2, 1851, to T. v. Schön, in which he writes: "Die Philosophie ist durch Hegel und seine Schüler für geraume Zeit nicht nur diskreditiert sondern in ihrem eigensten Leben zerrüttet. Die Götzendienerei mit dem konstruierenden, ja schöpferischen Denken hat, indem alles ihm vindiziert wurde, zu dem Feuerbachschen Wahnwitz getrieben, der methodisch und ethisch jener polytechnischen Richtung ganz entspricht"; and the letter of July 17, 1852, to M. Duncker, which contains the following passage: "Weh uns und unserem deutschen Denken, wenn die polytechnische Misère, an der Frankreich seit 1789 verdorrt und verfault, diese babylonische Mengerei von Rechnerei und Lüderlichkeit, in das schon entartete Geschlecht noch tiefer einreisst. Jener bunte Positivismus, den man in Berlin betreibt, setzt diese Revolution des geistigen Lebens ins Treibhaus." (J. G. Droysen, *Briefwechsel*, ed. R. Hübner (Leipzig, 1929), II, 48, 120.)

71. Cf. D. D. Rosca, *L'influence de Hegel sur Taine* (Paris, 1928), and O. Engel, *Der Einfluss Hegels auf die Bildung der Gedankenwelt Taines.*

72. See S. Deploige, *The Conflict between Ethics and Sociology* (St. Louis, 1938), chap. iv.

73. See P. Barth, *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie* (1925).

74. See E. Grünwald, *Das Problem der Soziologie des Wissens* (Vienna, 1934).

75. C. Bouglé, *Chez les Prophètes socialistes* (1918), chap. iii.

76. That Comte's ideas influenced Veblen seems fairly clear. See W. Jaffee, *Les théories économiques et sociales de T. Veblen* (Paris, 1924), p. 35.

ANGUISH

Je ne viens pas ce soir vaincre ton corps, ô bête
En qui vont les péchés d'un peuple, ni creuser
Dans tes cheveux impurs une triste tempête
Sous l'incurable ennui que verse mon baiser:

Je demande à ton lit le lourd sommeil sans songes
Planant sous les rideaux inconnus du remords,
Et que tu peux goûter après tes noirs mensonges
Toi qui sur le néant en sait plus que les morts.

Car le Vice, rongeant ma native noblesse,
M'a comme toi marqué de sa stérilité,
Mais tandis que ton sein de pierre est habité

Par un coeur que la dent d'aucun crime ne blesse,
Je fuis, pâle, défait, hanté par mon linceul,
Ayant peur de mourir lorsque je couche seul.

—Stéphane Mallarmé, *Angoisse*

I do not come to win your flesh, o beast
In whom the sins of a whole people flow;
Nor in your sensual mane a tempest blow
Out of the cureless boredom of my kiss.
Bring me within your bed such dreamless sleep
As sinks beneath the waters of remorse—
Such as you too may taste, who have the whore's
Lust for a deeper nothingness than death.

Vice has consumed my born nobility;
I am more sterile than your sterile womb.
But while the heart within your breast of stone
Though fanged by crime, can never bleed, I flee—
Pale and undone and haunted by my tomb,
Fearful that I may die when I lie down alone.

—Maurice English, *after Mallarmé*

JOAD'S "DECADENCE"

A Book Review[1]

Robert Redfield

DR. JOAD'S forthright, opinionated, provoking book offers itself as two treatises intertwined: a philosophic defense of the objectivity of value, and a diagnosis of the sickness of our times. The decadence of which he writes consists in "dropping the object," a failure to admit the existence of value as an absolute standard of judgment. Because, says Joad, we do not recognize, as men once did, that the universe contains immaterial factors that are "apprehensible by the mind and the spirit and that exist in an eternal and transcendent order of reality, we are decadent: we regard human development as meaningless, or suppose that evolution is good, just because it occurs, as we tend to regard experience itself as good just because it occurs." Consequences of "dropping the object" are skepticism, hedonism, and subjectivism. One man's judgment as to the beauty of a picture or the goodness of an act is as valid as any other man's. There is no way of finding out anything about the universe; we can find out only about ourselves. Ideals and religion (we mistakenly suppose) are creations of men, useful in supporting practices that conduce to survival. As one has no way to choose between experiences except by consulting how one feels about the experience, pleasurable experience becomes the end. And all is a tale told by an idiot, signifying nothing.

This is the view of life which follows, Joad tells us, when "the object is dropped." This view Dr. Joad describes, deplores, and attempts to argue away.

Whether this book contains a good philosophic defense of the objectivity of value I have not the competence to say. It does seem to me to declare and also to illustrate something important about the way some modern Western men are coming to look upon the world. Indeed, Dr. Joad makes this view most apparent just at some of the points at which he is arguing that this "value-dropping" world view is false. He declares in one place that the value of a picture or an act is not to be determined by finding out how many people think well of it; yet as one argument (among several) that values exist outside the realm of sensory experience in a "real" order of their own he points out that nobody really thinks that the experience and not the object

[1] C. E. M. Joad, *Decadence: A Philosophical Inquiry* (New York, Philosophical Library, Inc., 1949).

is valuable. And when Dr. Joad comes to the task of telling us what then *is* the good, he seems to me to adopt the very subjectivity against which he is arguing.

He just announces what the better ends are. In some passages he says they are the good, the true, and the beautiful. In others he gives longer and different lists. In one passage he identifies five classes of spiritual goods: "the experience of responding to good painting and good music; pleasure in nature; reading great literature; the pursuit of truth; the experience of goodness in others and of moral endeavor in oneself." In the chapter having to do with politics he summarizes the "object" for communities in the form of a compact summary of the ideals of Western democracy.

All these things are good for me as well as for Dr. Joad, but I find nothing in the book to tell me how to derive just these good things from the mere acceptance of the principle that values have an absolute and transcendent existence. Indeed, at one point he explicitly abandons the possibility of identifying, except by the perceptions of the right people, the better values. "It is no satisfactory answer," he writes, "to the question, what in this connection do you mean by 'good' to say that I mean those works of art in which the value of beauty is manifested, and that by 'good taste' I mean the ability to discern it when it is present and not wrongly to assert its presence when it is absent. The answer is not satisfactory because its effect is to confront the answerer with the question, namely, what do you mean by 'beauty'? I must be content to leave the matter enclosed within a circle, and to say that beauty is that which is discerned and appreciated by persons of taste." (p. 256). So some are damned and some are saved and we cannot tell the saved from the damned! There is nothing in the book to suggest that Dr. Joad would make a different answer with regard to truth or goodness.

Moreover, in seeking to establish that certain values are better than others, absolutely and transcendently, he frequently brings forward assertions to the effect that somebody said so, or that this is the way he feels about it. In presenting to us "the social values," after having declared that the standard values are goodness, truth, and beauty, he adds, "There is also, Plato taught, an absolute value of justice." Does the absoluteness of the value depend upon the fact that Plato taught? Suppose only Confucius had taught? To apprehend the absolute values must we abandon the proofs of Dr. Joad and hope for the accident of the right teachers? And who are the right teachers? Dr. Joad continues: "Those who have been influenced by the teaching of Christianity are, I think, committed to the addition of certain further values, for example, mercy and compassion, as well

as a number of absolute obligations, for example, the obligation to treat the individual as an end and never merely as a means." (p. 228). Are we committed by virtue of the fact that Christian teaching has influenced us, or by virtue of the fact that Dr. Joad has proved that value exists in the object? If Dr. Joad is right, and it is not merely true that value is absolute but that mercy and compassion are also absolute, then we ought to be committed to these values whether or not we have been lucky enough to be influenced by Christian teaching. I can only suppose that to Dr. Joad the absolute values are there, in the immaterial real order of the universe, and that they are made known to us by somebody, according to what rule or plan I know not, and neither does Dr. Joad. And I must conclude that Dr. Joad's way of getting at the problem gives me no help in telling whether I have the right teacher or not.

In reading these passages in which we are told what the values are, I am impressed with the frequent references to what people generally feel or think, or more particularly to what Dr. Joad feels or thinks. "Most people would be willing to admit" the existence of truth, goodness, and beauty, he writes. Debussy's music he recognizes as decadent because when he listens to it he feels vitality and zest for life draining away. In the course of these pages Dr. Joad tells us a good deal about himself. He wants his "thoughts to be elevated and enlarged" and his "feelings stimulated and refined." He does not write well in the country, but he enjoys the outline of a down against a darkening sky. He has, or admires, a discriminating taste in food and drink. One gathers that he does not think very well of Americans, and children he does not find particularly interesting. Altogether, in a book devoted to demonstrating the reality of the object, there is surprisingly much about the subject—for with regard to these opinions and ideas I suppose Dr. Joad is the subject.

Whatever may be the final judgment as to the worth of this interesting book as a contribution to moral teaching, it says something that seems to me important and true about the developing world view of Western man. Lacking the knowledge needed for appraising Dr. Joad as a philosopher, I praise him as a sociologist. I turn from what he says about the Ought to what he says about the Is. He gives us a description of the way in which people in this part of the world at least are coming to look at man and the universe. The book can be read as a highly generalized description of the Western world in 1950.

This modern man looks out upon a universe without meaning or purpose. Whatever is, is within himself. There is but the one reality, the material and the sensory; mind and spirit are but words for

certain activities of this organism. Will, conscience, and reason, like religion and morality, are secondary phenomena, developments out of impulse. Freedom is a mere necessary belief (Koestler); as nothing is to be found "out there," interest and attention turn inward to the experience one feels oneself experiencing, and value lies only here. This experience, or even mere existence, is the basis of every popular habit, of every reflective viewpoint. Every passion, every emotion, may be glorified (romanticism). The popular pleasures are what is easily available, or what is praised by many; means are themselves the ends; it is good to have more things because it is good to have more things; it is good to go faster because it is good to go faster. Inventions are invented because it is good to have more inventions. Power is exercised for its own sake. Both personal and scientific interest turn upon the exploration of the self. Literary and artistic production is expression without further meaning; criticism is concerned with the states of mind of the artist, not with the truth of his work. Education is not telling people what is right; it is stimulating them to express whatever it occurs to them to express. And while the self takes the place of the not-self, nevertheless the importance and the dignity of the human individual decline, and the world comes to be populated by soulless, goalless, nonmoral two-legged termites.

This, in unfair brevity, is Joad's account of the contemporary syndrome. Of course it is an exaggeration, an overschematized picture. How true it is of some groups and classes and not of others raises countless problems for the sociologist to investigate. But that it is true, in some important degree, can hardly be denied. Dr. Joad, under the phrase "dropping the object," has brought together in terms of their common nature a wide range of characteristics of our times, from the attitude toward having a good time to Freudian psychology, from the decline of religion to the fashions in short story writing. He has made a sort of "Chrysanthemum and the Sword" of what our world is becoming, if it is not that already. He has given us a view of ourselves that shows not the extent to which our traditions are still effective in our lives, but the extent to which they are not. So we may take his work as descriptive sociology, and if we do not like the word "decadence" as a sociological concept, we can easily find one that sounds less evaluative—his own term "object-dropping" might serve. And, while we are about it, let us recognize that this is indeed a concept for Dr. Joad, a concept to be used in comparative sociology. For some of the characteristics of this decadence, this object-dropping, he suggests were to be found also in the late Roman Empire and at other times and places. This describes the object-dropping ethos.

Or shall we say, the non-ethos? For this is a world view that differs in the most fundamental respect conceivable from all other world views. Where the men of other societies, from the Andaman Islanders to the Europeans of the Middle Ages, looked out upon a universe in which there was purpose and meaning, in which certain goods were assumed to be in the very nature of things and so compulsory upon men, in which the soul—as some sort of nonmaterial entity—inhabited the body, rather than the body producing a fluctuating manifestation called the self—where this has been the common way of men from the beginnings of humanity, on the other hand in a few places and times, and most especially nowadays, men develop a view of a meaningless, nonmoral universe, and there is no good but experience itself, no progress but the long unwinding of the senseless reel. If this be true, the student of societies with an interest in what are sometimes called "ideologies" has before him two great classes: the object-holding, to which almost all peoples have belonged, and the object-dropping, of which our own developing society is the most characteristic, but not the only, case.

The consequences of adopting such an understanding of the variety and classification of world views might be considerable for students of comparative religion, or of cultures, or of civilizations. For then we would see this developing society not as one that has this religion or that, but as one that, in some sense, has no religion, and no moral order. And the historian of civilization who compares Western civilization with that of the Chinese or that of the Maya may find that it is a Western civilization coming to an end which he is comparing with these others. And it may also follow that the civilization, if that is what it is to be called, which Dr. Joad is describing, differs more, in its most fundamental character, from the Western civilization of tradition—the one Toynbee is talking about—than it does from the dead civilization of the Maya or the traditional civilization of China. Such an understanding would perhaps lead one to see that the two worlds, the one dying and the one struggling to be—one hesitates somehow to say "born"—are two worlds of an order of difference not involved in the usual comparisons made by anthropologists or philosophers of history.

But of course the description may not be as valid as it sounds to me, or the trend of which Dr. Joad gives such a convincing account may not continue. And this thought turns us to the question: what are the circumstances under which object-dropping is likely to occur? Now it is just here that Dr. Joad's sociological bent is most apparent. For he does not look upon decadence, or object-dropping, as the

visitation of the Lord upon a sinful mankind; he finds explanations for its appearance, in more than one time and place, in the circumstances of society, or history. There is a certain regularity of circumstance, a sketch of a sociological law, in what Joad has to say about the circumstances favorable to the development of the object-dropping world view. These conclusions are not assembled by him in one systematic exposition, but are expressed here and there through the book. Two classes of circumstances may be recognized. First, there is the likelihood that the object will be dropped and experience will be valued for its own sake in times that follow periods of unusual effort and excitement, as periods of war. The faiths for which men die mean less now that men do not die for them, and all experience seems a little flat. Then, says Joad, there follows a romantic movement, a glorification of whatever experience gives any zest, and the cult of the hero or the superman. And Joad hears Walter Pater telling men to learn to burn continuously with a hard, gemlike flame, the early Roosevelt praising the strenuous life, and Mussolini reviving the glories of waging war.

Second, there are—says Joad—those circumstances that are special to our times and that set patterns of thinking and feeling conducive to dropping the object and finding all value in the experience in itself. These circumstances have been noted by others as related to the secularization of modern life; Joad's emphasis is to see these societal factors as both weakening or destroying religion and morality, and also as affecting aesthetic sensibility. It is enough here merely to mention them: the example of science in taking account only of what is material and measurable; the effects of democracy in deciding all issues by counting heads; the reduction of taste to its lowest common denominator through commercial advertisement; the effect of loss of leisure upon creativity and artistic judgment.

There is one class of societal circumstance to which Joad gives special attention, devoting a chapter that is in effect a self-contained essay on the evils of specialization. The follower of Durkheim on this point will be interested to read here how the division of labor becomes, not a source of morality, but a factor in the decline of morality—in the "dropping of the object." For Joad regards specialization as an evil, for particular reasons, and for one great reason. Economic specialization is bad, for a highly specialized community is exposed to starvation or the sufferings of mass migration when circumstances change. Specialization in science and learning makes it impossible for men to understand one another; there are no longer common tastes and common knowledge. All this is familiar, but the

great and central reason which Joad sees for decrying specialization is that the specialized man is less likely to "respond to objects," that is, to recognize absolute values; and so, in short, becomes less human, more of a two-legged termite.

But the argument against specialization becomes an argument against large communities. To Joad it is the large community which is characterized by specialization, subjectivism, and the dropping of the object; in the small community man is versatile, and there he exhibits "that response to the universe as a whole which we call religion." Throughout this discussion the small community Joad has in mind is Renaissance Florence, and, of course, the Athens of Pericles. In these generalizations as to the relation of smallness to object-holding we hear much of Athens, but little of Sparta. And that Florence of the last half of the fifteenth century was as religious as some earlier European communities may be doubted. Nor does Joad's attention turn further back to those communities that existed before civilization, and that the ethnologist studies today, except to declare that in them man was so concerned with pursuits of utilitarian significance, and so unfamiliar with any participation in activities that did not conduce to his advantage or to that of his group, that, we are led to understand, in primitive life religion had little place. It is not the primitive man I know that Dr. Joad knows. And if primitive man was so busy with utilitarian pursuits that he could do no more than concern himself with the immediately present in space and time, then what was it that made some men of the Renaissance free to do so? I should suppose that it was some of this same specialization which Dr. Joad decries, and that Ghiberti's bronze doors were made possible by the toil of fullers, dyers, and weavers in woolens. And the lot of these was not a very happy one. Like Clive Bell, to whose book *Civilization* Dr. Joad applies the word "great," Joad wants enough specialization to support an intellectual elite. Indeed, like Bell, he hopes for a development of the life of the spirit for no more than a few intellectuals. In the majority, "the mind of the life and the spirit will have largely atrophied," and Joad, in the last pages of "Speculations," suggests that the intellectuals may be allowed by the "normals" to enjoy life in their own superior way in consideration for undertaking the tedious work of government on part time. But even this relatively happy outcome Joad fears cannot come to be, for he thinks that the advent of a popular and degraded culture introduces a situation which Plato did not have to contemplate in planning for his philosopher-kings. It is the bad taste and amorality of the masses that will, fears Joad, corrupt even the successors of Dr.

Joad in that world of the future, that "insecthood" of mankind which is likely to come about, if civilization is not first entirely destroyed in war.

With this utterly dark prophecy, pleasantly recognized as the merest speculation, the book concludes. For Dr. Joad does not turn his sociological generalizations toward practical application. Except for a recommendation of regional economic autonomy, he has nothing to say as to how the bitter ending might be averted by the deliberate decision of men. So in this book there is more philosophy than sociology, certainly than social reform. The book is an account of certain trends of the times, unified by a large and enlightening conception, the "dropping of the object." It is also a personal exposition of certain values many of which I, for one, also embrace and wish to see preserved and developed. As to how these values might be saved, Dr. Joad offers, for whatever effect it may have or for its mere interest, a brief argument as to the reality of certain goods outside space and time. What else man can do about it, Joad does not know or say.

But God can do something about it, says Joad. I have said nothing here of Dr. Joad's theism. It is not needed in the principal argument of the book. On pages 396 to 400 the reader will find a very short statement of the considerations which lead Dr. Joad to take the position that the universe is the creation of a purposive mind. (The proof is by elimination of alternatives.) As Dr. Joad has the hope which a belief in God gives, he cannot "square the extinction of humanity with the belief that God created man as an immortal soul destined for eternal life."

Each world view, the traditional and the new, has then its possible way out, its ray of hope. And intimations of both can be found in this book. If we follow Joad the philosophical theist, the times are bad, but it is just possible that God may grant mankind another grace. But Joad is not content to leave the event entirely in the hands of God: he looks for the causes of the neglect of the true, the good, and the beautiful in certain conditions of society, such as the size and specialization of communities. Then, to this view, the cure may lie in finding and arranging those conditions of society under which the good, the true, and the beautiful might again be recognized. If we follow Joad the sociologist, the times are bad, but it is just possible that even in an empty universe man may find a way to make those changes in society and thereby in himself which will bring about his own redemption.

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